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E1980s was a period of emergence for individual employee rights
land the impact of state laws and state court decisions on the em-
ployee-employer relationship. In contrast to the 1960s and the 1970s,
when the overwhelming majority of labor and employment law activity was
within the federal courts and with federal agencies, the pursuit of state court
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claims by employees marked the 1980s. At least with respect to fundamen-
tal issues such as the employment-at-will doctrine and the enforceability of
covenants not to compete, employees experienced a substantial expansion of
their rights. Particularly with respect to the erosion of the at-will doctrine,
the judicial successes achieved by employees at the expense of employers cut
across many state lines.
As with any pendulum, the movement swings both ways. Recently, the
pendulum of employment rights seems generally to be traveling along a path
more favorable to business interests. Although more pronounced in other
states, state judiciaries have recognized self-imposed restraints with respect
to wrongful discharge claims. In decisions such as those rendered by the
California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,1 the New York
Court of Appeals in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,2 and the
New Mexico Supreme Court in Melnick v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insur-
ance Co.,3 the courts have recognized that the economic impact attendant to
eroding or obliterating the at-will doctrine is an issue primarily for legislative
focus. If wrongful discharge claims are to be expanded, the elected legisla-
tors, not judges, should make the decision because such changes may have
potentially grave consequences on businesses and economic development
within the state.
Similarly, public policy pronouncements are better made by legislators
than judges. As evidenced by the Texas Legislature's enactment of the Cov-
enants Not to Compete Act,4 which effectively reversed the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.5 and reinstated the general
enforceability of such covenants, law makers may well evaluate or interpret
public policy differently than judges.
Only time will tell whether or not the pendulum of employment rights is
truly moving in favor of employers, or if recent developments are simply
mid-course corrections. In any event, the counterweight of resistance will
always be felt whenever the pendulum swings too far in one direction.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE: CONTINUING CHALLENGES
Although the Texas Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine, 6 the doctrine has remained intact, with only
1. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
2. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 93, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1983).
3. 106 N.M. 726, 749 P.2d 1105, 1109, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 67, 102 L. Ed. 2d 44(1988).
4. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
5. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)
6. TEx. AGRIC. CODE ANN. art. 125.001 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for exercising
rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service); Tex. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007
(Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political convention); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN.§§ 431.005-431.006 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for military service); TEx. REV. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for refusing to participate in an
abortion); Id. arts. 5154g, 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge for membership or nonmembership
in a union); Id. art. 5182b, § 15 (Vernon 1987) (discharge for exercising rights under Hazard
Communication Act); Id. art. 5196g (Vernon 1987) (discharge for refusing to make purchase
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two narrow public policy exceptions for the last 102 years.7 Recently, the
Texas Supreme Court in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.8 held public pol-
icy favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine when an employee proves that the principal reason
for his discharge was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or pay-
ing for benefits under the employee's pension fund.9 Previously, the supreme
court in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck0° held public policy, as expressed
in the laws of Texas and the United States that carry criminal penalties,
requires the creation of an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
when an employee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally
illegal act ordered by his employer.11
In McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 12 McClendon sued his former em-
ployer, Ingersoll-Rand, alleging that his employer discharged him from em-
ployment so as to avoid contributing to his pension fund. After nine years
and eight months of working for Ingersoll-Rand, and four months prior to
the vesting of McClendon's retirement and pension benefits, Ingersoll-Rand
discharged McClendon pursuant to a work-force reduction of one salesper-
son. Ingersoll-Rand moved for summary judgment based on the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. The trial court granted the motion and the court of
appeals affirmed. The supreme court reversed and held that a plaintiff has
stated a cause of action if he alleges "that the principal reason for his termi-
nation was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits
under the employee's pension fund." 13 While the supreme court recognized
the wide acceptance of the employment-at-will doctrine, it noted the statu-
tory and public policy exceptions to the doctrine. The court concluded that
the public policy protecting the integrity of pension plans compelled a sec-
from employer's store); Id. art. 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge based on union membership or
nonmembership); Id. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for complying with a sub-
poena); Id. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (Vernon 1987) (Texas Commission on Human Rights Act) (dis-
charge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age, or sex); Id. art. 5547-300,
§ 9 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge due to mental retardation); Id. art. 6252-16a, §§ 24
(Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge of public employee for reporting violation of law to appropri-
ate enforcement authority); Id. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge based on good faith
workers' compensation claim).
7. East Line & Red River R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see
Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts not hesitant to de-
clare employment-at-will doctrine alive and well).
8. 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), cert granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1990) (No.
89-1298). The question presented before the Supreme Court is whether ERISA pre-empts a
state common law claim that an employer has unlawfully discharged an employee to interfere
with his attainment of benefits under an ERISA-covered benefit.
9. Id. at 71. The McClendon decision is discussed in more detail in parts I.A.2 and II.
In the authors' opinion, the dissenters correctly pointed out that the new exception only pro-
vides an "imaginary claim." Id. at 72 (Cook, J., dissenting, joined by Phillips, C.J., and Hecht,
J.). Justice Gonzalez also agreed with Justice Cook's dissent. Id. at 71.
10. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
11. Id. at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16 (Sth Cir. 1988) ("Sab-
ine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the violations of law the em-
ployee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties' ").
12. 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989).
13. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
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ond exception to the at-will doctrine. 14
As the dissenters correctly recognized, the supreme court's decision in
McClendon provides an "imaginary claim" at best. Is As discussed in part II
in more detail, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pro-
vides that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any lawsuit for
employment discharge allegedly motivated by the employer's intent to avoid
pension responsibility.16 The state courts simply have no jurisdiction over
these claims. Moreover, upon removal, the employer should raise ERISA
preemption of all common law claims as ERISA sets forth the exclusive
remedies available. 17 Therefore, the careful defense practitioner will remove
the plaintiff's case to federal court within 30 days after the plaintiff's peti-
tion is served on the employer or within 30 days after it becomes apparent
that the plaintiff has raised allegations covered by ERISA.
Since the supreme court's decision in Sabine Pilot, several courts have ap-
plied the Sabine Pilot exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In two
cases in which the discharges were not covered by a strict reading of the
Sabine Pilot exception, one court extended Sabine Pilot to protect the em-
ployee, and one court refused to extend Sabine Pilot beyond its express
terms.
In Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co. 18 the court of appeals interpreted
Sabine Pilot to protect an employee who was discharged because she con-
tacted a federal agency before performing a certain work-related task to de-
termine if her actions violated any laws.19 Del Mar required Johnston to
prepare shipping documents for goods being sent to other cities. Accord-
ingly, Del Mar instructed Johnston to package a semi-automatic weapon for
delivery to a grocery store in Brownsville via United Parcel Service and to
label the package as fishing gear. Because Johnston was required to sign the
shipping documents, she was concerned that her actions might violate some
law. Johnston thus sought the advice of a federal agency, and a few days
later she was fired. Johnston then sued alleging that she was fired because
she inquired into whether her acts were illegal and reported suspected viola-
tions to a regulatory agency-whisleblowing. The trial court granted Del
Mar's motion for summary judgment based on the employment-at-will doc-
trine. On appeal, Johnston argued that her claim fell within the Sabine Pilot
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Johnston ar-
14. Id. Whether tort damages are available under this new cause of action is unclear.
Ordinarily, damages available for common law wrongful discharge are contractual in nature.
Justice Cook's dissenting opinion assumes that tort damages will be available. Id. at 73 (joined
in dissent by Phillips, C.J. and Hecht, J.). Justice Gonzalez opined, in his dissent, that the
issue is unsettled. Id. at 75. Significantly, the majority analyzed McClendon's prayer for relief
seeking tort damages as a basis for distinguishing the case from those cases preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Id. at 71 n.3 (suggesting the court may allow tort
damages for this new cause of action).
15. Id. at 72, 75.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
17. See id. §§ 1131, 1132(g) & (i) (1982).
18. 776 S.W.2d 768 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
19. Id. at 770-71.
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gued that because Sabine Pilot provides that an employee has a cause of
action when fired for refusing to perform an illegal act, an employee should
have a cause of action when fired for inquiring into whether an act is illegal.
Del Mar responded that requiring Johnston to mislabel the contents of a
package was not a criminal offense under any law, and that Sabine Pilot did
not protect an employee who makes an inquiry into the legality or illegality
of an act.20 The court of appeals observed that in order to refuse to commit
an illegal act, 'an employee must know or suspect that the requested act is
illegal.21 While in some instances it may be obvious, the court noted that, in
other instances, an employee may be unsure.2 In those cases, it is reason-
able to expect that an employee will try to find out whether the act is in fact
illegal.23 The court concluded that if an employer could discharge an em-
ployee at this point, an employee would be forced to choose between two
undesirable alternatives: possible discharge if she attempts to determine the
illegal status of the act or potential criminal penalties if she performs the act
without investigation that would have revealed its illegality.24 Therefore,
the court held:
Mhe Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an em-
ployee has a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to
perform an act which may subject her to criminal penalties. Public pol-
icy demands that she be allowed to investigate into whether such ac-
tions are legal so that she can determine what course of action to take
(i.e., whether or not to perform the act).25
The court added that whether the requested act was in fact illegal or not is
irrelevant.26 The relevant inquiry is whether the employee had a good faith
belief that the requested act might be illegal, and such belief was reason-
able.27 Finally, the court emphasized that it was not creating a new excep-
tion to the employment-at-will doctrine; rather, it was merely enforcing the
narrow public policy exception created in Sabine Pilot.28 The Del Mar
court, however, clearly extended the Sabine Pilot exception, irrespective of
its attempt to limit the holding. Johnston's claim against Del Mar did not
fall within the narrow exception created by Sabine Pilot.
In Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,29 the court of appeals
20. Del Mar relied on Maus v. Living Centers, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 776 S.W.2d at 770-71. The court declined to follow Maus for two
reasons: first, it was decided three years prior to Sabine Pilot, and second, Maus involved a
situation where an employee reported questionable acts of others not where the employee her-
self was asked to perform an act she believed to be illegal. Id. at 771.





26. Id. at 772.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 771. The court also specifically stated that its holding should not be construed
as creating a private sector whistleblower exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at
772 n.5; cf. Tex. Rev. Ci. Stat Ann. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (governmental
employee cannot be discharged for reporting suspected illegal activity).
29. 781 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ granted).
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declined to extend Sabine Pilot beyond the express terms of the exception
created by the supreme court. Winters sued the Chronicle alleging that the
Chronicle had discharged him because, at various times, he had reported to
Chronicle management that managers and supervisors were engaged in cir-
culation fraud, inventory theft, and a kick back scheme. Winters argued
that the Chronicle's conduct amounted to a retaliatory discharge for having
reported illegal activities and for having refused to participate in illegal ac-
tivities, thereby falling within the Sabine Pilot exception. The Chronicle
moved for summary judgment asserting that Winters had failed to state a
cause of action under Sabine Pilot. Winters argued that Sabine Pilot should
be extended to cover not only employees who refused to commit crimes, but
also those who reported illegal activity to their employers. The trial court
declined and granted summary judgment in favor of the Chronicle. On ap-
peal Winters conceded that he was an at-will employee and that he was not
discharged solely because he refused to commit a crime.30 He argued, how-
ever, that the court should broaden the Sabine Pilot exception to include
employees who report crimes to their employers. The court declined Win-
ters' invitation to extend Sabine Pilot, noting that as an intermediate court it
was bound to follow the supreme court's authoritative expressions of law.31
The court of appeals thus affirmed the trial court's summary judgment be-
cause the Sabine Pilot exception covers only the discharge of an employee for
the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.32 The
supreme court granted Winters' application for a writ of error on the issue of
whether Sabine Pilot should be extended to cover employees who are dis-
charged for reporting illegal activities and for refusing to participate in ille-
gal activities. 33
In Turner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. 34 Turner was hired as a
plant nurse for Owens. Four years later, Turner began to have conflicts with
certain supervisors over the confidentiality of employee medical records, use
of unsuitable ear plugs on the plant floor, and Turner's perceived failure to
deal with employees in a kind and compassionate manner. Turner, an at-
will employee, was thereafter given an option: either voluntarily admit her-
self to a substance abuse facility or be discharged. Turner refused and was
discharged. Turner then sued Owens for wrongful discharge. The trial
court granted Owens' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals
affirmed and observed that, under the employment-at-will doctrine, Turner
30. While the court observed that the legislature had enacted "a 'whistleblower' statute to
protect public employees who report crimes to 'an appropriate law enforcement authority...
in good faith,"' the court noted that the statute was inapplicable because Winters was not a
public employee, he did not report crimes to a law enforcement authority, and he did not claim
the statute's protection. Id. at 409 (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5252-16a (Vernon
Supp. 1990)).
31. Id. (citing Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964); Lumpkin v. H&C
Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, writ
denied)).
32. Id.
33. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 244, 244 (Feb. 21,
1990).
34. 777 S.W.2d 792 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
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had no cause of action.3" Furthermore, Turner was not ordered to perform
an illegal or unlawful act, thereby bringing her claim within the Sabine Pilot
exception.36
In Brunner v. Atar37 Janet Brunner alleged that she was wrongfully dis-
charged because she refused to quit her volunteer work with the AIDS
Foundation. Brunner alleged that her employer discharged her because he
feared that he would catch the acquired immune deficiency syndrome be-
cause of her work as a volunteer with the AIDS Foundation and that her
employer feared that she would spread AIDS to the other employees. Brun-
ner's employer contended that Brunner was terminated because she refused
to work the hours required, she requested to be terminated, and she did not
perform the work expected of her. The employer moved for summary judg-
ment alleging that Brunner failed to state a cause of action.38 The trial court
granted the motion and Brunner appealed.39 The cqurt of appeals affirmed
and held that Brunner had not alleged sufficient facts to place her within the
Sabine Pilot or McClendon exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.4°
The court added that if another exception to the at-will doctrine is to be
created, that it was a matter within the province of the supreme court.41
In Garg v. Narron42 Ebasco Services was a subcontractor on the South
Texas Nuclear Project, and Garg, its employee, was a quality assurance engi-
neer on the project. Garg reported to his supervisor violations of certain
codes and regulations of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shortly thereafter, Garg was trans-
ferred to another department and then discharged. Garg sued in state dis-
trict court alleging wrongful discharge under Sabine Pilot. Ebasco Services
removed the case to federal court on the basis that the Atomic Energy Act 43
and the whistleblower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act 44 pre-
empted Sabine Pilot.
Garg moved to remand the case, and the district court granted the mo-
tion. Among other reasons for remanding the case, the court held that fed-
35. Id. at 795.
36. Id.; see also Duke'v. San Jacinto River Auth., 778 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1989), rev'd, 783 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1990). Justice Brookshire, in his dissent, ob-
served that the employer's offer to Duke for an hourly wage rather than a monthly salary was
neither illegal nor within the Sabine Pilot exception. 778 S.W.2d at 126.
37. No. 01-89-00389-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 15, 1990, n.w.h.).
38. Id. slip op. at 2.
39. Id. slip op. 2-3.
40. Id. slip op. at 4.
41. Id.
42. 710 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (interpreting Texas law).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
44. Id. § 5851(a) (1982). Section 5851(a) prohibits employer discrimination against an
employee who has(1) commenced... a proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (together herinafter the Acts] ... or a proceeding for the administration
or enforcement of any requirement imposed under [the Acts];
(2) testified... in any such proceeding or;
(3) assisted or participated... in any manner in such a proceeding... or in any
other action to carry out the purposes of... [the Acts].
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eral law preemption of nuclear safety45 does not create a basis for removal.46
The court found that Garg's complaints were completely internal complaints
about quality control and that Garg failed to show he contacted or was in-
volved with any governmental entity.47 Because Garg's complaint did not
fall within section 5851 of the Energy Reorganization Act, his wholly inter-
nal complaints were outside the scope of the federal cause of action.4" The
court also found that Garg's claim did not "arise under" federal law for
purposes of section 1331, federal question jurisdiction.49 Because the federal
laws at issue were only collateral to the case and not in the forefront as
required for federal question jurisdiction, the removal was improper.50 The
court observed that, under Sabine Pilot, state law provided a cause of action
for an employee who refuses to violate any law-whether federal or state.5'
Despite the court's suggestion to the contrary, 52 the facts do not reflect that
Garg was discharged for refusing to commit an illegal act, thereby bringing
his claim within the Sabine Pilot exception to the at-will doctrine. If Garg's
discharge was for relating violations of federal law to officials within his
company, then his claim is outside the scope of Sabine Pilot.5 3
Recently, the supreme court declined an opportunity to create another
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In Hernandez v. Corrigan
Dispatch Co. 54 Corrigan employed Jose Hernandez and paid him piece-rate
wages. Hernandez worked for Corrigan everyday, and Corrigan had the
right to control and direct Hernandez' work. Hernandez contended that
Corrigan paid him less than the minimum wage on occasion. As a result,
while employed by Corrigan, Hernandez filed a claim for unemployment
compensation asserting that his wages earned through piece-rate production
at Corrigan were less than the maximum of unemployment compensation
benefits allowed him under law, and that he was, therefore, entitled to at
least partial unemployment compensation benefits. Corrigan responded al-
leging that it was not Hernandez' employer within the meaning of the Un-
employment Compensation Act. The Texas Employment Commission
ultimately issued a determination favorable to Hernandez. Following re-
ceipt of the adverse decision, Corrigan discharged Hernandez. Hernandez
sued Corrigan for wrongful discharge, and Corrigan moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted Corrigan's motion. The sole issue on ap-
peal was whether Hernandez' allegation that he was discharged for asserting
his claim to unemployment benefits stated a cause of action. The court of
45. 710 F. Supp. at 1118 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Con-









54. No. 04-87-00485-CV (rex. App.-San Antonio, Sept. 28, 1988, writ denied) (not
published).
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appeals held that it did not.55 The court observed that the legislature had
not created an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine by enacting a
wrongful discharge provision under the Unemployment Compensation
Act.56 Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that the supreme court,
not an intermediate court such as itself, should create any judicial exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine.57 Hernandez appealed to the supreme
court, but the court denied Hernandez' application for a writ of error. 58
Despite long-term adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine, chal-
lenges to the rule continue. In some instances the courts invite further chal-
lenges.5 9 The substantive attacks on the employment-at-will doctrine
include novel constitutional, statutory, and common law claims arising from
a change in the terms and conditions of employment or the termination of
the employment relationship. Because juries are often sympathetic to em-
ployees and/or hostile to employers, and substantial verdicts continue to be
rendered against employers, wrongful discharge litigation will continue to
escalate.60 ,While no amount of planning and precaution will protect em-
ployers from every potential legal theory, employers must be prepared to
respond to new and creative challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine.
55. Id. slip op. at 7.
56. Id. slip op. at 4-6.
57. Id. slip op. at 6 (citing Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
58. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 92, 92 (Nov. 22, 1989).
59. In Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (rex. 1985) Justice Kilgarlin,
joined by Justice Ray, concurring in the judgment, wrote that the employment-at-will doctrine
"belongs in a museum, not in our law," and that it is a "relic of early industrial times" and a
harsh anachronism. Id. at 735. Justice Brookshire of the Beaumont court of appeals has vol-
unteered his criticism of the at-will doctrine on two occasions. In Duke v. San Jacinto River
Auth., 778 S.W.2d 123 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 783 S.W.2d 209(Tex. 1990). Justice Brookshire suggested that the at-will doctrine was "trite and hackneyed."
Id. at 125 (dissenting opinion). Earlier, in Turner v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 777
S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied), Justice Brookshire volunteered his
opinion that "[c]ogent and compelling arguments can be made that [the employment-at-will
doctrine]... is unenlightened," but he did recognize that "such a basic policy rule is properly
within the prerogatives of the legislature of Texas." Id. at 795; see also Johnston v. Del Mar
Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, n.w.h.) (criticizing em-
ployment-at-will doctrine as "a 'relic of early industrial times' and a 'harsh anachronism' ").
In Little v. Bryce, 733.S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), a case not
even involving the at-will doctrine, Justice Levy wrote a lengthy concurring opinion in which
he strongly attacked the employment-at-will doctrine as a "tenacious vestige from the indus-
trial revolution and laissez-faire economics." Id. at 939. Because of the unnecessary attack on
the at-will doctrine the majority opinion expressly disassociated themselves from the views
expressed by Justice Levy. Id. Subsequently, in two dissenting opinions, Justice Levy reiter-
ated his view that the employment-at-will doctrine should be repudiated in its entirety.
Lumpkin v. H&C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540-41 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist
Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 505
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
60. Estimates in the late 1970s indicated less than 200 wrongful discharge cases were filed
annually against private-sector employers. A. WESTIN & A. FELiV, RESOLVING EMPLOY-
MENT DISPUTES WITHOUT LmGATION 2 (1988). By contrast, an estimated 20,000 wrongful
discharge cases are now pending in state courts. Id.; see Bacon, See You in Court - Employee
Suits Against Employers are Turning Into a Legal Combat Zone, NATIoN's BuSINESS July
1989, at 18. A recent study of jury decisions showed that an employee claiming wrongful
discharge has an eighty-six percent chance of winning a case against a private employer. Id. at
17. In California, for example, the average award to employee plaintiffs was $650,000. Id.
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A. Common Law Challenges
1. Employment Agreements
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party, or it
is left indefinite or determinable by either party, then either party may termi-
nate the contract at-will and without cause. 61 An employment-at-will rela-
tionship, absent a specific contract term to the contrary, may be terminated
at any time by either the employer or employee, for any reason or no reason,
with or without cause, and without liability for failure to continue employ-
ment. 62 During the last several years, however, wrongful discharge litiga-
tion based on the violation of a written or oral employment agreement has
proliferated. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed modify
the at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for the dis-
charge of an employee.
a Written Modifications of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine.
In order to avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of
action for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically prohib-
ited the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.63 The
writing must provide in a "special and meaningful way" that the employer
does not have the right to terminate the employment relationship at will."
Employment is therefore generally found to be at will, absent a writing that
specifically states otherwise.65 The requirement of a written contract arises
from the requirement of the statute of frauds that to be enforceable an agree-
ment which is not to be performed within one year from the date of the
making must be in Writing.66
61. East Line & Red River R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see
also Pfeiffer & Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L..
97, 98-99 nn.8 & 9 (1988) (cites several cases discussing employment-at-will doctrine).
62. East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; cf. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779
S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989) (holding an at-will employee may not be terminated where the
principal reason for the termination is the employer's desire to avoid contribution to or paying
of benefits under the employee's pension fund); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d
at 735 (court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to commit
illegal act; noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-will employees).
63. Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.
App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Mc-
Clendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989) (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast,
Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M.W.
Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127).
65. Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127.
66. Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's
Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d
at 846 (quoting TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987)); Benoit v.
Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406.
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In Dobson v. Metro Label Corp.67 Ron Dobson brought suit against Metro
Label Corporation for wrongful discharge under an alleged employment
contract. Dobson contended that Metro Label hired him on July 14, 1987,
as a general manager at a salary of $60,000 a year. Jerome Abbott, the chief
executive officer of Metro Label signed a memorandum dated July 14, 1987,
which provided: "Offer today for General Manager @ $60,000 base salary
per year with no bonus arrangement initially." The memorandum was
signed by Abbott. Dobson and Abbott also agreed that Dobson would re-
ceive the usual employee benefits. Dobson began working for Metro Label
on August 3, 1987 and he was discharged approximately one month later.
Dobson sued Metro Label for wrongful discharge. Metro Label moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted Metro Label's motion; Dob-
son appealed. 68 The court of appeals affrmed and held that the memoran-
dum between Dobson and Abbott did not satisfy the statute of frauds and,
therefore, could not form the basis of an enforceable employment contract.6 9
The court initially observed that "[i]f Dobson had worked for Metro Label
for one year as contemplated by the alleged contract, he would have worked
until August 2, 1988. '' 70 The memorandum was dated July 14, 1987, and
Dobson argued that the employment term would have ended August 2,
1988, more than one year.7 1 Because the contract could not have been per-
formed within one year from the date of its making, it was subject to the
statute of frauds.72 Furthermore, the court noted that the statute of frauds
requires that a writing be complete "in every material detail and containing
all essential elements so that resort to oral testimony is not required."7 3 The
court held that the memorandum only established that Metro Label made an
offer on July 14, 1987, for an unspecified managerial position at a salary of
$60,000 per year, with no initial bonus arrangement.7 4 Dobson, however,
contended that the writing established that "it was he who was hired, that
his employer was Metro Label, that the job he accepted was as general man-
ager of three Metro Label plants, and that the period of employment was for
one full year." s75 The appellate court held that because oral testimony was
necessary to complete the material terms of the contract, the memorandum
did not satisfy the statute of frauds as a matter of law.76 The court also
rejected Dobson's argument that the hiring of an employee for a stated sum
for a particular period of time is a definite employment for the period
stated.77 The court held that the cases relied upon by Dobson were not ap-
plicable either because the statute of frauds did not apply or it was satisfied
67. No. 05-89-00550-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 27, 1990, n.w.h.).
68. Id. slip op. at 1.
69. Id. slip op. at 7.
70. Id. slip op. at 5.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Chevalier v. Lane's Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 111, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948)).
73. Id. (citing Cohen v. McCutchin, 565 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1978)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Cohen, 565 S.W.2d at 232).
77. Id. slip op. at 6.
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in those cases. 78 The court also held that the other cases relied upon by
Dobson involved enforcement of a contract based upon estoppel due to sur-
rounding circumstances,7 9 and Dobson did not plead estoppel based on sur-
rounding circumstances. Accordingly, the court held that the memorandum
did not satisfy the statute of frauds and affirmed the summary judgment 80
In several instances employees have attempted to avoid the employment-
at-will doctrine by contending that the employee handbook or manual con-
stituted a contractual modification of the at-will rule.81 The Texas courts,
however, have adhered to the general rule that employee handbooks, which
are not accompanied by an express agreement mandating specific procedures
for discharging employees, do not constitute written employment agree-
ments.82 Employees are, thus, still subject to the employment-at-will
doctrine.83
In Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp. " Soltex discharged Emmett Falconer
for not immediately agreeing to a drug screen test. Falconer sued, claiming,
inter alia, that his termination was in violation of a written employment con-
tract. During his employment, Falconer signed a consent form agreeing in
78. Id. (citing Hoffrichter v. Brookhaven Country Club Corp., 448 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (alleged employment agreement was for three months;
therefore, the statute of frauds do not apply); Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 354 S.W.2d 397(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) (written employment contract satisfied the statute
of frauds)).
79. Id. (Molnar v. Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Culkin, 354 S.W.2d at 400; Dallas Hotel v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
80. Id. slip op. at 7.
81. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12,
1989) (not published); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North
Texas Municipal Water Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's
Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
684 F. Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410,
413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d
at 846; see also Lowry, The Vestiges of the Texas Employment-At- Will Doctrine in the Wake of
Progressive Law: The Employment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 327 (1986) (ap-
plying principles of consideration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
82. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9; Manning v. Upjohn
Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT & T Information Sys., 793 F.2d 113,
114 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. at 842; Valdez v. Church's
Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 622; Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. at 156;
Musquiz v. Diamond Shamrock and Refining Co., No. 04-88-00093-CV (rex. App.-San
Antonio July 12, 1989, no writ) (not published); Lumpkin v. H&C Communications, Inc., 755
S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Salazar v. Amigos Del
Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d at 413; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit v.
Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 128;
Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (rex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ);
Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ);
Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (rex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). Contra Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1996, 1998(5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting). The incongruity between Aiello and Joachim, which
Judge Jones highlighted, and an analysis of Texas cases, establishes that Aiello is an aberration
and not a correct interpretation of Texas cases.
83. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989).
84. No. 89-2216 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not published) (interpreting Texas law).
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advance to submit to blood, urine, or other medical examinations requested
by Soltex in connection with any company investigation of the possible use
of alcohol or controlled substances during work hours or on company prem-
ises by employees. Falconer alleged that the consent form, together with
related company policy statements, constituted a written contract governing
his employment, thereby precluding his status as an at-will employee. Soltex
moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted Soltex's mo-
tion. In granting summary judgment, the district court found that Falconer
was an employee-at-will and that the consent form and related policy state-
ments did not constitute a written contract, or limit the company's right to
terminate him. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that, although the docu-
ments set out company policy and some procedures the company might in-
tend to follow, the documents were unilateral statements and not
contracts.85 Interpreting Texas law, the court observed that handbooks is-
sued unilaterally by an employer are not the equivalent of written employ-
ment contracts and, thus, do not create any limitation on the employment-
at-will doctrine.8 6
In Bowser v. McDonald's Corp. 87 Bowser brought an action against her
former employer for wrongful termination. Although McDonald's had is-
sued a written employment handbook, it expressly stated that Bowser's em-
ployment was for an indefinite term. Not surprisingly, the district court
granted McDonald's motion for summary judgment on this issue. 8
In Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Ina c 9 Gloria Rodriguez sued her for-
mer employer for wrongful discharge. Rodriguez had signed a written em-
ployment agreement with Benson Properties, but the written agreement did
not contain any provisioni concerning a term of employment or conditions
for termination of employment. Because Rodriguez did not produce any
evidence showing that Benson Properties modified her at-will status in writ-
ing, the district court granted Benson Properties' motion for summary
judgment. 90
b. Oral Modifications of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created by the employee and em-
ployer agreeing orally to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral em-
ployment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to terminate
an employee-at-will depending upon the terms of the agreement and the
facts and circumstances surrounding the employment.
In Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.91 Schroeder brought suit against
his former employer alleging wrongful discharge based on breach of an oral
contract. Schroeder asserted that between November 1983 and January
85. Id. slip op. at 8.
86. Id. slip op. at 8-9.
87. 714 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
88. Id. at 841.42.
89. 716 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
90. Id. at 277.
91. 769 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted).
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1984 his boss assured him on at least three occasions that his job was secure
until he reached age sixty-five. At the time of these statements, plaintiff was
fifty-seven years old. Reviewing the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of the employer, the court of appeals observed that the alleged oral employ-
ment contract was within the statute of frauds because it could not be per-
formed in less than eight years;92 therefore, the summary judgment was
proper.93
Schroeder also argued that Texas Iron Works was precluded from dis-
charging him by virtue of his detrimental reliance under the theory of equi-
table estoppel.94 Relying upon his boss' statements, Schroeder built a
retirement home. Schroeder's testimony, however, revealed that Texas Iron
Works did not make the alleged assurances in order to induce him to build
his retirement home. Moreover, Schroeder admitted that his employer had
no more knowledge of the future downturn in the oil industry, and the corre-
sponding impact on Schroeder's employment, than he did. Accordingly, the
summary judgment was affirmed.9" The supreme court granted Schroeder's
application for a writ of error.96
In Wiley v. Bertelsen 97 H. H. Bertelsen and another hired Hubert Wiley to
be their ranch manager. Five years later they discharged Wiley and sued
him for wrongful conversion of farm equipment. Wiley counterclaimed for
wrongful discharge in violation of an oral employment contract. The oral
contract allegedly provided that Wiley was to receive one-third of the pro-
ceeds from a future sale of the ranch and cattle, less their purchase price.
The only evidence as to the amount of time Wiley was required to manage
the ranch before he would be entitled to one-third of the sale price was Wi-
ley's testimony that he and his employers had talked about a ten-year period.
The employers moved for summary judgment, contending that the alleged
oral contract violated the statute of frauds because it was not performable
within one year. The trial court granted the motion, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed.98 The court held that, in addition to the requirement that
Wiley perform his job for ten years before his entitlement to the sale pro-
ceeds would mature, the contract violated the statute of frauds because it
could not be performed within one yea. 99
92. Id. at 628.
93. Id.
94. The court set forth the elements of equitable estoppel: "(1) a false representation or
concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge of those facts; (3) to a party without
knowledge, or means of knowledge, of such facts; (4) with the intention that it be acted on; and
(5) detrimental reliance by the party to whom the representation is made." Id. at 629 (citing
Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 415, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1952)).
95. Id.
96. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 295 (Mar. 7, 1990). Two of the issues the supreme court intends to
address are whether the employment contract must be in writing and whether contracts for an
indefinite term are subject to the statute of frauds. Id. at 296.
97. 770 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
98. Id. at 883.
99. Id. at 881-82 (citing TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon Supp.
1987)).
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Recalling Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Co. 100 Falconer was discharged after
refusing to submit to an immediate drug test. Falconer alleged, inter alia,
that his discharge was a breach of an oral contract. The oral contract con-
sisted of statements by a company representative to the effect that, as long as
he did not violate any of the company rules and did his job, he would have a
job forever. Recognizing the statute of frauds problem, Falconer contended
that since he was evaluated yearly, the oral contract was performable within
a year and, therefore, did not violate the statute of frauds. The court held
that Falconer failed to produce specific evidence of an oral contract that
could be performed within one year.101 Citing Stiver v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., 2 Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc,°103 and Molder v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. 104 the Fifth Circuit held that the promise of employment for-
ever is akin to a promise of lifetime or permanent employment which is the
type of employment agreement which must be reduced to writing to be en-
forceable.Y15 Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of the employer
was affirmed. 10 6
In Karp v. The Fair Store, Inc 107 Karp was hired by The Fair Store as a
turn-around man, which is a name for someone capable of bringing success
to an ailing company in an unfavorable economic climate. During the inter-
view, Karp explained that job security was important to him. The store's
president, Klein, told Karp that no written contract would be needed, but
that Klein would deal with him in good faith and would only fire him for
just cause. During Karp's at-will employment, he began a private, romantic
relationship with another employee, Hurst. When Klein heard rumors of
the relationship, he told Karp that three things would cause Karp's immedi-
ate discharge: bad credit, fooling around with fellow employees, and steal-
ing. One day, Karp was told that Klein wanted to meet with him. After
Karp neglected to go to Klein's office, Klein drove to Karp's home and ob-
served Hurst's car. Initially, Klein intended to fire Karp for poor perform-
ance, but after Karp failed to come to Klein's office, and after Klein saw
Hurst's car at Karp's home, Klein decided to discharge Karp for immoral
conduct and insubordination. Karp sued the store for, inter alia, breach of
an oral contract to discharge Karp only for just cause. Recognizing that
Texas law allows parties to an employment contract of an indefinite term to
orally argue that termination will only occur for good cause,108 the court
100. No. 89-2216 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not published) (interpreting Texas law).
101. Id. slip op. at 10.
102. 750 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
103. 728 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. 665 S.W.2d 175 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Falconer, No. 89-2216, slip op. at 9-10. Contra Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex.
106, 110-11, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948) (statute of frauds not applicable to a promise of
lifetime employment); Central Nat'l Bank of San Angelo v. Cox, 96 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1936, no writ) (statute of frauds not applicable to promise of employment until
death or incapacitation).
106. Id. slip op. at 10.
107. 709 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (interpreting Texas law).
108. Id. at 741-42 (citing Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, no writ)).
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addressed the issue of whether Karp and the store did in fact reach this oral
agreement. 10 9 First, the court found that Karp and the store did not reach
an understanding on the issue of just cause.110 Karp testified that Klein
promised that he would only be discharged for just cause; Klein, however,
testified that certain conduct would result in immediate discharge. Second,
the court held that, even if a valid oral contract existed, the store had just
cause for terminating Karp's employment." 1 Karp was fired for conduct
the store considered to be immoral.1 12 The court observed that "lilt [was]
not for this court to define 'immoral conduct,' nor to tell the company that
'immoral conduct' is an improper ground for termination."' 13 The court
further commented: "If the Court were to find that such conduct does not
constitute just cause for termination, it would merely be substituting its busi-
ness judgment for that of the company, with no legal predicate
whatsoever."1 14
In Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc. 11 5 Rodriguez claimed that she was
wrongfully discharged from her employment, because Benson Properties
orally promised her a job as long as her work performance was satisfactory.
Moreover, Benson Properties allegedly agreed to terminate her employment
only for just cause and to provide notice, an investigation, and a hearing
before termination. Noting that the oral agreement could not be performed
in one year, the court granted Benson Properties' motion for summary judg-
ment.11 6 The oral agreement, therefore, violated the statute of frauds, ren-
dering it unenforceable.1 1 7
2. The Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: "Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket. "118
In McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 119 the issue was whether the duty of
good faith and fair dealing should be imposed on the employee-employer
relationship.1 20 Both sides of the bar anxiously awaited the supreme court's
109. Id. at 741.
110. Id. at 741-42.




115. 716 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (interpeting Texas law).
116. Id. at 277.
117. Id. (citing Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
118. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S.
Apr. 16, 1990) (No. 89-1298).
119. 779 S.W.2d 69 (rex. 1989).
120. Id. at 73-74, 75, 75 n.7 (Cook, J., dissenting, joined by Phillips, C.J., and Hecht, I.;
Gonzalez, J., dissenting). The court granted McClendon's application for a writ of error on the
following points:
POINT OF ERROR NO. 2
The Court of Appeals erred when it stated, contrary to the pronouncement of
the Texas Supreme Court, that the employment "at will" doctrine was not judi-
cially created and cannot be judicially amended consistent with the democratic
ideals.
[Vol. 44
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
decision because an afflirmative answer to the issue would have abolished the
employment-at-will doctrine.121 Despite having granted McClendon's appli-
cation for a writ of error on that specific issue, the court did not address the
duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment agreements. 122 Instead, in
a 5-4 decision, the court dodged the issue entirely and reversed the summary
judgment in favor of the employer by carving out another exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.123
Although the supreme court avoided the real issue in McClendon, a varia-
tion of the issue was also pending before the court in Lumpkin v. H&C Corn-
munications, Ina 124 The sole point of error on appeal to the court of appeals
was whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in
the employer-employee relationship. 125 After Lumpkin had worked for de-
fendant radio station for almost seventeen years, he was allegedly fired with-
out notice and without good cause. Lumpkin admitted, however, that his
employment was not for a fixed term, and that his at-will relationship was
not contractually modified. The defendant moved for summary judgment,
and the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals rejected
Lumpkin's argument.126 As an intermediate appellate court, it was obli-
gated to follow the law as expressed by the supreme court and to leave
changes in the application of the common law to that court.127 Thus, by
exercising appropriate judicial self-restraint, the appellate court -affirmed the
trial court's decision.128
Lumpkin's application for a writ of error had been pending before the
supreme court for approximately one year when the court decided McClen-
don.129 Curiously, the supreme court did not grant Lumpkin's application
when it granted McClendon's application and consolidated the cases. Nev-
ertheless, shortly after McClendon, the court denied Lumpkin's application
POINT OF ERROR NO. 4
The Court of Appeals erred when it failed to recognize that a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing should be applied to respondent's employment relationship
with petitioner.
32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227, 227 (Feb. 22, 1988). As the dissenters observed, the court failed to
address these issues in their entirety. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 73-74, 75, 75 n.1 (Cook, J.,
dissenting joined by Phillips, C.J. and Hecht, J.; Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
121. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040
(1985) (adoption of duty of good faith and fair dealing would abolish employment-at-will doc-
trine); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 243 (1983) (duty of good faith and fair dealing and employment-at-will doctrine
are fundamentally inconsistent).
122. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 70. The majority included Justices Spears, Ray, Mauzy,
Hightower, and Doggett.
123. Id. at 69-70. For a discussion of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine, see part I.
124. 755 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
125. Id. at 539. The court thus considered the issue in the context of contract rather than
tort law.
126. Id. at 539-40.
127. Id. at 540.
128. Id.
129. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 11, 13 (Oct 15, 1988). Lumpkin's application was filed October 6,
1988 and assigned No. C-7979. Id.
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for a writ of error.130 As a result, the supreme court has now declined to
impose a duty or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in two
cases. Considering only four members of the court have expressed a clear
view disavowing the duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment con-
tracts, 131 employers should not assume that the issue is settled in Texas.
In. Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc. 132 the federal district court, in-
terpeting Texas law, analyzed whether the implied covenant or duty of good
faith and fair dealing should be applied to employment contracts and found
it inapplicable.1 33 The court observed that while a disparity of bargaining
power may be present in many employment contract situations, such ineq-
uity is not to the degree it exists in insurance contracts.'3 4 Although an
employer may control an employee, the court noted that the employer may
not control all aspects of the relationship.135 The court, therefore, held that
the employer-employee relationship is not the kind of special relationship
that gives rise to the imposition of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 136
In another federal district court case interpreting Texas law, the court
decided the case assuming that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
existed in Texas. If such a covenant or duty is adopted in Texas, this case
may provide some guidance as to what conduct constitutes good faith. In
Karp v. The Fair Store, Inc. 137 Karp was discharged because he engaged in a
romantic relationship with another employee in violation of company policy.
Assuming, arguendo, that the covenant had been adopted in Texas, the court
held that good faith means "that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose,
freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being
faithful to one's duty or obligation."' 138 The court also defined good faith as
"[o]ne who acts honestly, and not fraudulently," 139 or "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned."'' 4 Applying the definitions to the facts,
the court held that the decision to discharge Karp was honestly intended. 14'
The evidence showed that the company opposed romantic relationships be-
tween employees and discharged Karp for violating that policy.142
As a majority of the supreme court has not expressly refused to impose a
duty or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, employers may
130. Lumpkin v. H.&C. Communications, Inc., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114 (Dec. 6, 1989).
131. Chief Justice Phillips and Justices Gonzalez, Cook, and Hecht expressed the view that
the duty should not be imposed on the employment relationship. McClendon v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d at 73-74, 75.
132. 716 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
133. Id. at 277.




137. 709 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
138. Id. at 741 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623-24 (5th ed. 1979)).
139. Id. (quoting Wolraven v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 96 Tex. 331, 74 S.W.2d
530, 534 (1903)).
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be assured that the issue is not settled. In considering this issue, the supreme
court should be mindful of the tremendous impact on employers of an af-
firmative decision. The potential adverse economic consequences of imply-
ing an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts are
of great concern. Business journals have repeatedly cited the serious
problems emanating from such an obligation. 143 The effect on employers
should not be underestimated. The adoption of the duty would create poten-
tial litigation over every discharge irrespective of the reason. 144
Despite the common misconception that the judicial trend is to abrogate
the employment-at-will doctrine with the imposition of a duty or an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the employment relationship, the
trend is to the contrary. Within the past ten years, the vast majority of those
states that have recently considered the argument have explicitly rejected it.
Thirty-one state courts, six federal courts interpreting state law, the District
of Columbia, and one state legislature have considered and rejected adopting
either a duty or an implied covenant of good faith in employment con-
143. See, ag., Bacon, See You in Court-Employee Suits Against Employers are Turning the
Workplace into a Legal Combat Zone, NATION's Bus., July 1989, at 17; Bernstein, More Dis-
missed Workers Are Telling It to the Judge, Bus. WK., Oct. 17, 1988, at 68; DeFoe, Wrongful
Termination: The Lawsuit of the '80s, 2(37), Bus. J.-Saramento, Dec. 16, 1985, at 21; Gold
& Hamilton, Employer Liability Growsfor Discharging At- Will Employees, 58 J. AM. Hosp. A.,
July 16, 1984, at 121; Hoerr, It's Getting Harder to Pass Out Pink Slips, Bus. WK., Mar. 28,
1988, at 68; Hospitalk- The Target of Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 61 J. AM. Hosp. A., Sept.
5, 1987, at 58; Pepe & Curley, Fire At Will? Not Necessarily, AM. BANKnS A. BANKING J.,
July 1984, at 24; Weatherington, Employment-at-Will? Don't Fire At Willi Do's and Don'ts To
Stay Out of Court, Coal Age, Mar. 1986, at 61.
144. Noting that adoption of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing would abrogate
the employment-at-will doctrine and have significant economic ramifications on its state's
economy, the Tennessee court of appeals recognized:
[A]ny substantial change in the 'employee-at-will' rule should first be micro-
scopically analyzed regarding its effect on the commerce of this state. There
must be protection from substantial impairment of the very legitimate interests
of an employer in hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel available or
the very foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeopardized.... Ten-
nessee has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new indus-
try of high quality designed to increase the average per capita income of its
citizens and thus, better the quality of their lives. The impact on the continua-
tion of such Influx of new businesses should be carefully considered before any
substantial modification is made in the employee-at-will rule.
Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis
added).
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tracts. 45 Among the seven states'" that do imply a covenant, but not a
duty of good faith in the employment relationship, only one state' 47 allows
tort damages. Thus, clearly the adoption of a duty or an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in Texas would, in fact, be a departure from the
modem judicial trend.
Perhaps the supreme court's inability to reach a consensus on this impor-
145. Alabama.: Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (Ala. 1988). Arkan-
sas: Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 494-95 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (inter-
preting Arkansas law). Colorado: Farmer v. Central Bancorporation, Inc., 761 P.2d 220, 221-
22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). Connecticut: Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460,
470-71, 528 A.2d 1137, 1142 (1987). Delaware: Shockley v. General Foods Corp., No. 500,
slip op. (Del. Feb. 13, 1989) (not yet reported). District Of Columbia: Minihan v. American
Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 812 F.2d 726, 729 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Florida: Muller v. Stromberg-
Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Georgia: Gunn v. Hawaiian Air-
lines, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1982). Hawaii: Parnar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 374, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982). Idaho: Clement v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, No. 17004, slip op. (Idaho Nov. 22, 1988) (not yet reported). Illinois: Alderman
Drugs, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 783, 515 N.E.2d 689, 694 (1987).
Indiana: Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). Kansas: Mor-
riss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841, 851 (1987). Kentucky: Wyant v. SCM
Corp., 692 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). Maine: Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen
Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 99 (Me. 1984). Maryland: Adams v. Catalyst Research, 659 F.
Supp. 163, 164 (D. Md. 1987) (interpreting Maryland law). Michigan: Dahlman v. Oakland
Univ., 172 Mich. App. 502, 432 N.W.2d 304, 306 (1988). Minnesota: Hunt v. IBM American
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 1986). Missouri: Neighbors v.
Kirksville College, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). Montana: Romero v. J&J Tire,
777 P.2d 292, 294-96 (Mont. 1989) (wrongful discharge statute constitional); Meech v. Hil-
haven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 504 (Mont. 1989) (wrongful discharge statute constitutional
and no cause of action for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987). Nebraska: White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430
N.W.2d 27, 31 (1988). New Jersey: Citizens State Bank v. Libertelli, 215 N.J. Super. 190, 521
A.2d 867, 869 (1987). New Mexico: Melnck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 N.M.
726, 749 P.2d 1105, 1109, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 67, 102 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1988). New York:
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). North Carolina: Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App.
253, 335 S.E.2d 79, 85 (1985). North Dakota: Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of
Grand Forks, 407 N.W.2d 206, 214 (N.D. 1987). Ohio: Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.,
23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (1986). Oklahoma: Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d
549, 554 (Okla. 1987). Pennsylvania: Braun v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 635 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (interpreting Pennsylvania law). Rhode Island: Lopez v. Bulova Watch Co., 582
F.Supp. 755, 767 n.19 (D.R.I. 1983) (interpreting Rhode Island law). South Carolina: Sat-
terfield v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D.S.C. 1985) (interpret-
ing South Carolina law). South Dakota: Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint, 433 N.W.2d 221, 224
(S.D. 1988). Tennessee: Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981). Utah: Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978). Vermont:
State v. Meunier, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979). Virginia: Mason v. Richmond Mo-
tor Co., 625 F. Supp. 883, 890 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1987) (interpret-
ing Virginia law). Washington: Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 109 Wash. 2d 747, 748 P.2d
621, 624-25 (1988). Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335
N.W.2d 834, 838 (1983). Wyoming: Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704
(Wyo. 1985).
146. Alaska: Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 735 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988). Arizona:
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 384, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040-41 (1985).
California: Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 691, 765 P.2d 373, 410, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 249, (1988). Massachusetts: Kravetz v. Merchants Distrib., Inc., 387 Mass. 457,
460, 440 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (1982). New Hampshire: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). Oregon: Wyss v. Inskeep, 73 Or. App. 661, 664, 699 P.2d
1161, 1165 (1985).
147. Nevada: Kmart v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 48, 732 P.2d 1364, 1373 (1987).
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tant issue in McClendon, and its denial of the writ in Lumpkin, begs the
question whether this issue should be left to the legislature. 148 The court of
appeals in McClendon suggested that the legislature should resolve the is-
sue. 149 The court of appeals recognized that Texas' system of constitutional
government primarily relies on the legislature to declare public policy, and
that while the legislative process may be flawed, "'appeals for judicial legis-
lation based on legislative inaction betray a loss of faith in democratic gov-
ernment.' , 150 The New York Court of Appeals also answered in the
affirmative.151
Recently, the Montana Legislature took the initiative and overruled by
statute prior decisions of the Montana Supreme Court imposing an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship.
Concerned with excessive and uncontrolled jury verdicts in wrongful dis-
charge cases, the Montana Legislature recently passed the Montana Wrong-
ful Discharge From Employment Act.152 The Act establishes the extent of
employers' liability for wrongful discharge. 153 Specifically, the statute elimi-
nated Montana's common law cause of action for breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing that allowed a discharged employee to
recover punitive damages. 154
148. Turner v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 777 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1989, writ denied) (modification of at-will doctrine is properly within prerogatives of
legislature); Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 501 n.3 (rex. App.-
Austin 1989, writ denied) (udicial process is ill-suited for modifying at-will doctrine).
149. 757 S.W.2d at 820.
150. Id. (quoting Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (rex. Civ. App.-Dalas
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
151. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). Addressing the issue of the obligation of good faith in the employment
relationship, the New York Court of Appeals observed:
If the rule of nonliability for termination of at-will employment is to be tem-
pered, it should be accomplished through a principled statutory scheme,
adopted after opportunity for public ventilation, rather than in consequence of
judicial resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial liti-
gants.... For all the reasons stated, we conclude that recognition in New York
State of tort liability for what has become known as abusive or wrongful dis-
charge should await legislative action.
448 N.Ed.2d at 90. The New York court wisely concluded:
[t]he legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern
the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the
views of the various segments of the community that would be directly affected
and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and anticipate the im-
pact of imposition of such liability.
Id. at 89-90; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) ("Legislatures, in making such policy decisions, have the ability to
gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold hearings at which all inter-
ested parties may present evidence and express their views ...
152. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987).
153. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 490 (Mont.1989).
154. Id. The statute preempts the previous common law remedies. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-
2-913 (1987). Responding to an equal protection challenge to the statute under the Montana
Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court succinctly stated the paramount concern of every
state:
The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that lawmakers perceived an
unreasonable financial threat to Montana employers from large judgments in
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Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will continue to decline invitations
to impose a duty or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment relationship and leave this issue of fundamental importance to
the legislature because, if adopted, it will have a far-reaching and dramatic
effect on business in Texas. As many other state courts have recognized, the
legislature has far greater resources than the judiciary to resolve such issues.
The Texas Legislature acted quickly to overrule Hill and its progeny in the
area of noncompetition agreements because the supreme court's decisions
had an adverse impact on a favorable business climate.15 5 Any decision ad-
verse to Texas employers on the issue of a duty or an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing should be met with a similar legislative reaction.
3. Related Tort Claims.
In addition to breach of contract claims, employees often claim damages
under the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. To pre-
vail under this theory in Texas, four elements must be shown: (1) the defend-
ant acted either intentionally or recklessly, (2) this conduct was extreme or
outrageous, (3) the defendant's actions caused the emotional distress of the
plaintiff, and, finally, (4) the emotional distress was severe.156 While the
Texas courts have not recognized a cause of action for intentional or negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress arising from the termination of employ-
ment, the Fifth Circuit has permitted such a claim under extreme facts.
Nevertheless, an employee may recover emotional distress damages for con-
duct that occurred during the employment relationship.
In Bushell v. Dean 15 7 Dean, a female employee, sued her supervisor,
Bushell, and her employer, Syndex Corporation, for intentional infliction of
emotional distress s" arising from sexual harassment in the workplace.
Dean began working for Syndex as an orders clerk, and through a series of
promotions and raises, she became an office manager. Dean and her supervi-
sor, Bushell, had a good working relationship until certain events began to
occur. During a three-month period, Bushell bought Cokes for Dean or
sometimes paid for her breakfast; he told Dean about sexual problems he
common-law wrongful discharge claims. Testimony in legislative hearings also
indicated to legislators that large judgments in common law wrongful discharge
cases could discourage employers from locating their businesses in Montana.
The Act's limitation on damages is intended to alleviate these threats. There-
fore, the Act passes muster on this leg of the test because promoting the finan-
cial interests of businesses in the State or potentially in the State to improve
economic conditions in Montana constitutes a legitimate state goal.
Meech, 776 P.2d at 504.
155. See infra part III.
156. Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Tidelands
Auto Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
157. 781 S.W.2d 652 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, writ requested).
158. The court set forth the four elements of the cause of action: "(1) the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was 'extreme and outrageous,' (3) the actions of the
defendant caused the plaintiff mental distress, and (4) the mental distress suffered was severe."
Id. at 657 (citing Tidelands Automobile Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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was having with his wife; he tried to rub Dean's neck area, but quit when she
protested. On one occasion when Dean hugged Bushell to thank him for a
favor, Bushell tried to kiss her. Bushell also poked Dean in the ribs on two
or three occasions. Bushell also called Dean into his office and told her that
he loved her and that he wanted to have an affair with her. Dean told him
that she was flattered, but immediately left his office. Bushell raised the mat-
ter of his love for her and his desire for sexual relations on two other occa-
sions. At some point, Bushell acknowledged to Dean that his expression of
his feelings presented a difficult problem, that he probably should not have
told her, but that he was not sorry that he had. The issue did not resurface
until about two weeks later when Dean screamed at Bushell in front of other
employees that her favors were not for sale. After this incident, Bushell did
not speak to Dean except as to work-related topics, and he apparently be-
came more demanding as a supervisor. This situation continued for more
than a week when Dean informed Bushell of other employees' strike in pro-
test of a company wage freeze. Bushell became angry and began to shout at
Dean. Dean responded that he had no right to shout at her and quit. Dean
sued, and the jury awarded $100,000 in actual and punitive damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, $25,600 in actual and punitive
damages for assault, and $123,000 in attorney's fees.
On appeal, Bushell challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support
Dean's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically,
Bushell complained of the finding that his conduct was extreme and outra-
geous. Initially, the court observed that "Bushell's actions were vulgar and
unseemly." 159 The court noted that one's expression of one's feelings for
another, irrespective of the sincerity, can be the basis for a claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress if the expression is outrageous. 1 0 The
court defined outrageous conduct as conduct exceeding all bounds usually
tolerated by a decent society or of a nature calculated to cause, and does
cause, serious mental distress.161 While Bushell recalled the events as neu-
tral or acts of affection, Dean viewed them as humiliating and embarrass-
ing.16 2 The court did not find the jury's determination that Bushell's
conduct was outrageous was unsupported by the evidence. 163 The court,
therefore, affirmed the jury's verdict of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 164 The court further affirmed the jury's conclusion that Bushell's
conduct was within the course and scope of his employment, thereby making
Syndex jointly and severally liable for the damages. 165
In Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 166 a former employee, Beverly Dean,
brought suit against her former employer, Ford Motor Credit, alleging, inter
159. Id. at 658.
160. Id.





166. 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Texas law).
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alia, a pendent claim under Texas law for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Ford Motor Credit employed Dean as a clerk in the administrative
department of Ford's Amarillo office from 1981 to 1985, when she was dis-
charged. During her first performance review, Dean expressed an interest in
a promotion to the collection department, but was told that women usually
don't work in that department. Dean wrote a letter to the regional manager
complaining of that policy, and while her complaint was acknowledged, no
further action was taken. After her second review, Dean's evaluation was
upgraded from satisfactory to satisfactory plus. Shortly thereafter, Dean re-
ceived a promotion. The same month, Dean learned that an opening was
available in the collection department. Dean applied, but a man was hired
for the position. Thereafter, Dean's supervisors changed their attitude to-
wards her. Dean was moved from desk to desk, given additional work, sub-
jected to unfair harassment, and given additional special reviews. In
between two of these special reviews, bizarre incidents occurred. One day
while Dean was functioning as a cashier processing checks received in the
mail, she was told that a check was missing. Ten days later, Dean discov-
ered the check in her own cash box. Dean's supervisor had initialed Dean's
daily cash memos only twice: the date the check disappeared and the date it
reappeared. Also, the day after the check reappeared, Dean was again func-
tioning as a cashier when, on her lunch hour, she discovered in her purse
two checks made out to and endorsed by Ford. One of the checks had been
initialed by her supervisor. Dean became convinced that her supervisor was
attempting to set her up and prevent her transfer to the collection depart-
ment. Dean began to experience constant insomnia, headaches, and ner-
vousness, and became paranoid about what would next happen to her at
work.
When the branch manager returned from vacation, Dean reported the
check incidents to him. The branch manager conducted an internal investi-
gation without the knowledge of Dean's supervisor. After Dean's supervisor
learned of the investigation, Dean received a special review and her perform-
ance rating was downgraded to satisfactory minus. Dean was told that if her
performance did not improve within sixty days, she would be discharged.
During the sixty-day period, Dean was moved from function to function,
desk to desk and was never reviewed despite her repeated requests for a
review. After Dean pressured the branch manager for a review, matters
grew worse and she was discharged. Dean testified: she continued to have
insomnia, headaches, and nervousness after her discharge; she was emotion-
ally upset; and her on-the-job problems contributed to her subsequent di-
vorce. The jury awarded Dean $275,000 for her emotional distress claim,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 167
The Fifth Circuit found that the jury could infer from the evidence that
Dean's supervisor intentionally placed the two checks in her purse either to
make it appear that she was a thief or to put her in fear of such an accusa-
167. Id. at 301.
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tion.168 Such conduct, the court concluded, "pass[ed] the bounds of conduct
that will be tolerated by a civilized society and is, therefore, outrageous con-
duct."169 Finally, the court held that Dean's testimony regarding her emo-
tional distress and break-up of her marriage constituted sufficient evidence to
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas
law. 170 In his concurring opinion, Judge Jolly made it clear that this case
does not "open the door for a body of new law in the workplace. If I
thought so, I would not extend this nascent cause of action into the field of
employer-employee relations. If it were to be done, I would let the Texas
courts do it.1'171 Judge Jolly's analysis is correct. Clearly Dean's emotional
distress claim was based on her employer's conduct prior to her discharge
and, arguably, unrelated to her discharge.
In Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa172 a federal district court case
applying Texas law, the court held that the discharged employee did not
allege facts showing sufficient injury to prevail on an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. The court stated that when an employer legally
terminates an employee, the employer cannot be held liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 173 Specifically, the court observed that Laird
did not state a sufficient injury by feeling terrible or almost sick. 174
Similarly, two other federal district courts granted a summary judgment
ruling in favor of the employer using the same reasoning as the Laird court.
In Benavidez v. Woodforest National Bank 175 the court decided that a legal
discharge alone could not justify an intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim, and that, while distress is unavoidable in the loss of employment,
this common anxiety is not the type of severe emotional distress necessary to
form the basis of a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 176 In Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central177 the court granted the
Bank's motion for summary judgment on its former employee's claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The employee admitted that the
claim arose solely from his discharge. Observing that the Texas courts had
not recognized such a cause of action, the court granted the Bank's
motion. 178
168. Id. at 307.
169. Id. The court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 46 comment d
(1965) for a definition of outrageous conduct.
170. Dean, 885 F.2d at 307.
171. Id. at 308 (Jolly, J., concurring). The court's opinion reveals that it was truly offended
by the facts of the case.
172. 707 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (interpreting Texas law).
173. Id. at 941 (citing Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 462 (6th Cir. 1986);
Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Ledl v. Quik Pik
Stores, 133 Mich. App. 583, 591, 349 N.W.2d 529, 533 (1984)).
174. Id.
175. No. H-87-3094 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1989) (interpreting Texas law).
176. Id. slip op. at 7 (citing In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1986)); see Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy, Inc., No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6,
1989) (termination of employment normally cannot give rise to claim for emotional distress).
177. 710 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (interpreting Texas law).
178. Id. at 1105; see Perez v. Airco Carbon Group, Inc., No. C-88-13, slip. op. 4 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 9, 1990) (Texas does not recognize claim for intentional infiction of emotional distress
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In Karp v. The Fair Store, Ina '7 9 Karp alleged, inter alia, three tort theo-
ries due to his alleged wrongful discharge: prima facie tort, negligence in
discharging him, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under his
theory of prima facie tort, Karp argued that his discharge was intended to
inflict harm without excuse or justification. Under this theory, Karp was
required to prove that the store discharged him "maliciously... 'for the
sake of the harm as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some
further end legitimately desired."1 80 The court found that Karp was dis-
charged for one of three legitimate reasons---poor performance, insubordina-
tion, or immoral conduct-and not out of malice only.' 8' The court
explained denial of Karp's claim for negligent termination on the basis that
the employment-at-will doctrine is subject to a fixed number of exceptions
and that it would be inappropriate for it to create a new exception or
duty.' 82 Finally, the court denied Karp's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress because he had not produced evidence that the store's
conduct was extreme or outrageous.183
In Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. '8 4 the Texas Supreme Court held that an
employee can maintain a cause of action for tortious interference with a con-
tract 85 when employment is terminable at-will.186 Before the present case,
Sterner won a lawsuit against Marathon Oil in which he recovered damages
for injuries caused by gas inhalation. Thereafter, Sterner went to work for
Ford, Davis, and Bacon, contractors who were performing work at a Mara-
thon Oil facility. A Marathon Oil employee recognized Sterner, and the
next day Ford, Bacon, and Davis followed Marathon's order to terminate
Sterner's at-will employment. Sterner then sued Marathon Oil for tortious
interference with his employment contract with Ford, Bacon, and Davis.
Marathon Oil complained on appeal that no cause of action exists for tor-
tious interference with contract when employment is terminable at-will. The
supreme court disagreed and observed that "the unenforceability of a con-
arising out of employment termination); Castillo v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-199, slip.
op. 8-9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1990) (same); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E,
slip. op. 7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990) (same).
179. 709 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (interpreting Texas law). For a full discussion of
the facts of the case, see infra part I.
180. Id. at 742 (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. The North River Ins. Co., 673 F.2d 37, 40(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982) (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 203
(1904)). The court held that the theory was not part of federal common law and could be
applied in Texas through the Rule of Decision Statute, TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.001 (Vernon 1986). Id. at 742 n.I.
181. Id. at 742.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989).
185. The essential elements of a claim for tortious interference with contract are: (1) a
contract existing that was subject to interference; (2) the act of interference was willful and
malicious; (3) such intentional act was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; and (4)
actual damages or loss occurred. Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848, 854-56 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1987, writ denied). The plaintiff must show that the defendant maliciously inter-
fered with the contractual relationship without legal justification or excuse. Sakowitz, Inc. v.
Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1984).
186. 767 S.W.2d at 688-89.
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tract is no defense to an action for tortious interference with its perform-
ance."18 7 The court further noted that, until an at-will contract is
terminated, it is a valid contract with which third persons are not free to
tortiously interfere.188 At trial, Marathon Oil requested the trial court to
submit the issue of legal justification or excuse as an affirmative defense. At
the court of appeals, Marathon Oil challenged the legal and factual suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that it was not justified or
legally excused. The court of appeals agreed that no evidence supported the
jury's negative answer and reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment
against Sterner.189 The supreme court argreed that legal justification or ex-
cuse should be treated as an affirmative defense190 because the party assert-
ing the privilege does not deny the interference, but instead seeks to avoid
liability based upon an interest allegedly being impaired or destroyed by the
plaintiff's contract. 191 Upon review of the no evidence points of error, the
court, however, found some evidence that Marathon Oil acted without legal
justification or excuse;192 the case was, therefore, remanded to the court of
appeals for a determination of the factual sufficiency of the evidence chal-
lenge.193 Specifically, the court of appeals had to consider whether the jury's
failure to find that Marathon Oil acted with legal justification or excuse was
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 194 On remand,
the court of appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's findings1 95 and affirmed the jury's awards against Marathon Oil:
$2,975 for tortious interference with contract and $70,000 in exemplary
damages. 196
4. Contract Claims.
Where employers and employees agree to certain terms of employment
unrelated to termination of employment, an employee may maintain an ac-
187. Id. at 689 (citing Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 821 (rex. 1969)).
188. Id. (citing RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 766 comment g (1979)).
189. The supreme court observed that the court of appeals misinterpreted the jury question
and answer. Id. The court held that properly interpreted, the answer represents the jury's,
refusal to find that Marathon Oil acted with justification or excuse, thereby establishing that
Marathon Oil failed to carry its burden of proof, Id.
190. Under the defense of legal justification or excuse, a party is privileged to interfere with
another party's contract if it is done in a bona fide exercise of his own rights, or if he has equal
or superior rights in the subject matter to that of the other party. Id. at 691.
191. Id. at 689-90. The court overruled Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105 (rex.
1984); Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex 1976); Rural Dev.
Inc. v. Stone, 700 S.W.2d 661 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Terry v.
Zachry, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) to the extent
the decisions conflict with Sterner. 767 S.W.2d at 690.
192. 767 S.W.2d at 690.
193. Id. at 691.
194. Id.
195. Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 777 S.W.2d 128, 130-32 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ).
196. Id. at 131-32. The jury actually awarded $250,000 in exemplary damages, but Sterner
had only pled for $100,000 in exemplary damages. Id. at 132. The trial court refused to allow




tion against his employer on basic breach of contract principles. Most re-
cently, employees have sued their employers alleging that their employers
have failed to pay a benefit or bonus due under the contract.
In Lone Star Steel Co. v. Scott 197 an employee, Scott, sued his employer,
Lone Star Steel for, inter alia, breach of contract because of its failure to pay
him for a suggestion that he made which improved slag removal efficiency
and increased operating time in the company's steel soaking pits. When
Lone Star told Scott that management considered the invention to have been
conceived by another employee and that he would not be compensated, Scott
requested that Lone Star release any rights it had in the invention so that he
could develop it on his own; Lone Star refused. Expert testimony revealed
that Scott's suggestion produced approximately $60,000,000 in extra profits
to Lone Star during the first year. The jury awarded Scott over $3,000,000
for his breach of contract claim.
On appeal, Lone Star argued that as a matter of law no contract existed,
and, in the alternative, the evidence was insufficient to support the elements
of a contract. 19 While Lone Star Steel Company's Suggestion Plan made
performance optional on the part of the employer and, therefore, not a bind-
ing contract, 199 the court found that Lone Star's company newspaper modi-
fied the plan.2°° The court held that the newspaper's representation that an
award would be paid for suggestions adopted, constituted a valid unilateral
contract which became binding when accepted and performed by Scott.20
The jury's award was thus affirmed.202
In Lang v. MBank Dallas20 3 Rhonda Lang worked at MBank Dallas as a
futures and options trader in its capital markets group. In its offer of em-
ployment, MBank informed Lang that she would be eligible to participate in
its incentive plan. Under the plan, employees received a bonus based on
individual and group performance. Lang worked through 1985 and received
her 1985 incentive plan payment in February 1986. In 1986 Lang was dis-
charged. Lang thereafter sued to recover incentive payments for the first
four months of 1986. MBank countered that Lang was not employed by the
bank in February 1987 when the incentive payments for 1986 were dis-
bursed, thereby disqualifying her for the plan. The district court granted
MBank's motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. 2 4 The court observed that, while an employee who is entitled to a
percentage of profits may ordinarily recover his share of the profits earned
197. 759 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
198. Id. at 151.
199. Id. at 152 (citing Long v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Parrott v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 85
S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1935, writ ref'd); Rieden v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, 184 S.W. 689 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916, no writ)).
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Carlini v. United States Rubber Co., 8 Mich. App. 501, 154 N.W.2d 595
(1967)).
202. Id. at 154-55.
203. 756 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
204. Id. at 812.
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up to the date of termination,20 5 the terms of the incentive plan can qualify
the general rule and limit payment to active employment at the time of dis-
bursement.2°6 MBank established that an employee must be employed at
the time of disbursement to be entitled to participate in the plan, and Lang
did not show any reason why the plan's limitations were not applicable to
her, rendering summary judgment appropriate. 2 7
In a similar case, Burkhard v. ASCO Co.20 Lisa Burkhard brought an
action seeking payment of a bonus that she alleged was due to her under her
employment contract. The contract, which required yearly renewal, pro-
vided that Burkhard would be entitled to a bonus if she generated a certain
level of revenues during the term of the contract. The contract was silent on
the issue whether Burkhard would be paid a bonus if she terminated her
employment before the end of the term. Nine months into her third year of
employment, Burkhard voluntarily terminated her employment. ASCO re-
fused to pay her a bonus, claiming that she forfeited her rights to a bonus by
terminating her employment prior to the completion of the contract term.
The jury awarded awarded Burkhard the bonus, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding that Burkhard presented no evidence that she generated
sufficient revenues to trigger the bonus provision. On appeal to the supreme
court, the court found some evidence in the record to support the jury's
verdict.209 Therefore, the court of appeals' no evidence finding was reversed,
and the case was remanded to the court of appeals to determine the factual
sufficiency points of error.210 Parenthetically, the supreme court noted that
the contract did not condition Burkhard's right to a bonus on her continued
employment for a year and had not been orally modified.211
B. Statutory Claims
1. Claims Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
In Bushell v. Dean 212 the court addressed the issue of whether the admis-
sion into evidence of an expert's testimony regarding the profile of a sexual
harasser213 was reversible error.214 In this case, Dean, a female employee,
205. Id. (citing Haggar Co. v. Rutldewicz, 405 S.W.2d 462, 465 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
206. Id. (citing Walker v. American Optical Corp., 265 Or. 327, 329, 509 P.2d 439, 441
(1973)).
207. Id. at 812-13.
208. 779 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1989).
209. Id. at 806.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ requested). For full discussion of the
facts in this case, see supra part I.A.3.
213. Proffle testimony is based upon research that reveals certain common facts about indi-
viduals who exhibit a particular behavior. Id. at 655. The research, in this case, consisted of a
compilation of information on the personalities of an unrelated test group of other persons
accused of sexual harassment. Id. The profile is a combination of facts of other case files,
thereby causing the separateness of each individual file to be lost. Id.
214. Id. at 656.
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filed a complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights215 against
her employer, Syndex Corporation, and, upon receiving a right to sue letter
from the TCHR, Dean filed a lawsuit for sexual harassment. During trial,
Dean's expert described a typical sexual harasser as a married man who is
the victim's supervisor and has known the victim for at least six months.
Through other witnesses, Dean showed that the expert's profile constituted
an accurate description of Bushell. The jury awarded damages to Dean
based upon her claim for sexual harassment. Syndex argued on appeal that
the admission of the profile testimony was error because such evidence was
irrelevant as well as inadmissible character evidence and its probative value
was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court sustained all
three points of error.216 Noting that a fair trial requires each dispute to be
determined on its own facts, the court held that profile testimony was not
relevant as it necessarily involved facts from other similar cases. 217 The con-
duct of one individual under certain circumstances is never a safe criterion
by which to judge the behavior of another individual.218 Consequently, the
profile testimony was irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. 219 The court also
held that the probative value of the profile testimony was low because it did
not involve any facts about Bushell or his relationship with Dean.220 On the
other hand, the danger of prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury was
high with the profile testimony-it was presented as expert testimony, and
the evidence of similar situations is highly persuasive in nature.221 The pro-
fie testimony was also inadmissible on these bases.222 Finally, the court ob-
served that the profile testimony, as character evidence, depended on the
following logic: sexual harassers have particular personality traits; that
Bushell possessed those traits; and Bushell, therefore, probably committed
sexual harassment.223 The court found that the use of proffle testimony to
prove the character of Bushell through the character of third parties was
error.224 More importantly, however, the court held that the error in admit-
ting the profile testimony was reversible error.225 The court found the proof
of sexual harassment to be so evenly divided that the cogent expert testi-
215. Dean filed her complaint with the Austin Human Relations Commission which for-
warded her complaint to the TCHR. Syndex claimed there was no jurisdiction because it was
located outside the city of Austin and because the complaint was not filed with the TCHR
before initiating the lawsuit as required by TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a)
(Vernon 1987). The court dismissed Syndex's argument because the TCHR's authority to
handle the complaint could not be invalidated by the Austin Commission's assistance in filling
out the complaint and forwarding the complaint to the TCHR. Id. at 655.
216. Id. at 657.
217. Id. at 656.
218. Id. at 655 (citing P. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS ADMINIS-
TERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND (8th ed. 1987)).
219. Id. (citing TEx. R. Cxv. EVID. 402).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 656.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 656 n.6 (citing C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, Texas Law of Evidence Civil and
Criminal § 676 (1987)).
225. Id. at 657.
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mony was probably very persuasive to the jury.226 Thus, the court reversed
Dean's claim of sexual harassment and remanded the claim for a new
trial.227
In Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.228 Thomas Schroeder alleged, inter
alia, that he was discharged because of his age, in violation of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA).229 Schroeder, however,
failed to file a complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights
(TCHR). Texas Iron Works moved for summary judgment on the basis
Schroeder failed to pursue his administrative remedy before filing suit.
Schroeder argued that the filing of a complaint with the TCHR is not a
prerequisite to an age discrimination suit under the TCHRA. The district
court disagreed and granted Texas Iron Works' motion. The court of ap-
peals affirmed and held that an aggrieved party who seeks relief under
TCHRA must, as a preliminary step, file a complaint with the TCHR.230
The supreme court has granted Schroeder's application for a writ of error on
this issue.231
In Green v. Aluminum Co. of America232 Ezell Green filed complaints
against his union and ALCOA on February 7, 1986, alleging that both had
retaliated against him for prior discrimination claims. ALCOA suspended
Green for three days without pay on May 3, 1985, and, coincidentally,
Green filed a grievance with the union. On November 19, 1985, Green re-
ceived notice from his union that his grievance had been dropped. Green
then filed a charge of discrimination with both the TCHR and the EEOC on
February 7, 1986. Green filed the charge within 180 days of the alleged date
of discrimination by the union, but more than 280 days after the alleged date
of discrimination by his employer. 233 On June 29, 1987, Green received his
226. Id.
227. Id. at 659.
228. 769 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted). The facts are more
fully discussed in part I.A.l.b.
229. Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k,
§ 5.01(1) (Vernon 1987).
230. 769 S.W.2d at 628; see also Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989, writ requested) (must fie complaint with TCHR as administrative prerequisite to filing
suit); Lang v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., No. H-88-4212 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 1989) (ap-
plying Texas law, dismissed claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
231. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 295 (Mar. 7, 1990). The supreme court intends to address the issue
whether an aggrieved party must file a complaint with the TCHR before filing a civil suit in
district court. Id. at 296.
232. 760 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
233. The court observed that Green's complaint against ALCOA was filed more than 180
days after the alleged date of discrimination as required by TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5221k, § 6.01(a) (Vernon 1987). Id. at 380. While it was unnecessary to the disposition of the
appeal, Green's complaint against ALCOA was at least timely filed with the EEOC, if not the
TCHL Under Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., 841 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 109 S.
Ct. 82, 102 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1988), where a state such as Texas has an employment discrimination
statute similar to the federal statute, (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (1982), an employee has 300 days in which to file a complaint with the EEOC
whether or not proceedings are instituted timely under state or local law. Id. at 125 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982)).
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notice of right to sue letter from the TCHR. Two days later, Green filed a
lawsuit in district court.
ALCOA and the union filed motions for summary judgment asserting that
Green's suit was barred under the TCHRA. The trial court granted the
motions, and the court of appeals affirmed.234 The court observed that the
TCHRA's requirement that the filing of a lawsuit occur within one year of
the filing of the administrative complaint, irrespective of the TCHRA's dis-
position of the complaint, is mandatory. 235 Because Green filed his com-
plaints on February 6, 1986, but did not file his lawsuit until July 1, 1987, he
failed to meet the one-year time limit.236
A person may not fie a complaint under the TCHRA if he has already
initiated an action in a court of competent jurisdiction or with an adminis-
trative agency under any other law or local ordinance based on the same
grievance.237 For that reason, in Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central238 the
court stayed Victor Fiorenza's claim under the TCHRA pending the out-
come of his previously filed cause of action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.239
2. Claims Under Article 8307c of Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated.
Since the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Azar Nut Co. v. Caille240
allowing punitive damages under article 8307c of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, litigation has markedly increased in this area, posing a threat of
substantial damages to employers. 241 In Hodge v. BSB Investments, Inc.242
234. 460 S.W.2d at 381.
235. Id. at 380 (citing Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(a) (Vernon 1987)).
236. Id. at 381.
237. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(f) (Vernon 1987).
238. 710 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (interpreting Texas law).
239. Id. at 1104-05 (citing Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 14(a), 29
U.S.C.A. § 633(a) (1985)).
240. Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1987). Punitive damages may be
recovered under article 8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8307c § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
241. Borges, South Texas Verdict a New Record for Wrongful Firings, Texas Lawyer, Sept.
4, 1989, at 4, discusses two multimillion dollar verdicts that have been rendered under Ta-x.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c §§ 1-3 (Vernon Supp. 1990). An El Paso County jury
awarded $2.5 million in Mundy v. Wells Fargo Co., No. 88-917 (Dist. Ct. of El Paso County,
346th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Apr. 27, 1989). Mundy is currently on appeal. Also, a Cameron
County jury returned a verdict of $11 million in De La Rosa v. Borden, Inc., No. 88-07-4301-
E (Dist. Ct. of Cameron County, 357th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 27, 1989). According to
the article, De La Rosa was accidentally shocked hooking up his delivery truck to an electrical
outlet while employed by Borden as a wholesale route salesmen. De La Rosa recovered from
his injuries enough to return to work, but continued to suffer severe residual pain. In January
1987, De La Rosa filed a workers' compensation claim. On April 1, 1988, De La Rosa's
supervisor asked him to see a doctor recommended by the company. De La Rosa refused,
stating he first wanted to talk to his lawyer. When De La Rosa later informed his supervisor
le would not go see the doctor, he was fired for violating a company directive. The company
apparently believed that the workers' compensation claim had been settled at the time De La
Rosa was fired. Damages resulting from the firing were calculated by the jury at $36,000 in
past lost wages, $800,000 in future lost wages and benefits, and $150,000 for past mental
anguish. The jury assessed $10 million in exemplary damages. The trial court, however, lim-
ited De La Rosa's recovery to $10,986,000. The case is on appeal.
242. 783 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
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Elizabeth Hodge, an employee of BSB Investments, was injured within the
course and scope of her employment. At the time Hodge was injured, BSB
Investments was not a subscriber under the Workers' Compensation Act.
After her injury, Hodge hired an attorney and filed a claim for benefits with
the Industrial Accident Board. BSB then terminated Hodge. Hodge sued
BSB for retaliatory discharge under article 8307c. The trial court granted
BSB's motion for summary judgment on the basis that an employee of a
nonsubscriber is not protected by article 8307c. 243 Hodge appealed, and the
court of appeals reversed. 244 The appellate court noted that article 8307c,
section 1, refers to employers as persons and to employees generally.245 The
court held that the Legislature's use of the term person indicated its intent
not to limit article 8307c to subscribers only.246 Thus, the court "con-
clude[d] that article 8307c applies equally to employees of subscribers and
nonsubscribers. 247
In Farah Manufacturing Co. v. Alvarado24'8 the plaintiff, Alvarado, con-
sulted with an attorney after his release from a hospital and subsequently
filed a workers' compensation claim. Alvarado reported back to work and
presented Farah with two notes from his attending physicians that contained
restrictions on certain physical activities. Alvarado admitted that these limi-
tations prohibited him from performing the job he had carried out prior to
his illness. Farah advised Alvarado that it did not have any other work for
him at that time. Thereafter, Alvarado received a letter from Farah asking
whether he would accept the next available job or whether he would prefer
to wait for the job he had previously held. Alvarado responded that he
would accept any job Farah had available. One year passed without a job
becoming available, and under the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, Alvarado's seniority and recall rights were terminated. Alvarado then
filed suit against Farah under article 8307c of the Workers' Compensation
Act for retaliatory discharge asserting that Farah recalled employees with
less seniority to other job classifications after being laid off. Farah responded
that the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, coupled
with Alvarado's medical restrictions, precluded it from providing alternative
employment. The jury awarded Alvarado $138,080 in actual damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages.
During the trial, Farah presented evidence to show that it had complied
with the collective bargaining agreement and that it had acted within the
legal mandates of the agreement. Alvarado, in rebuttal, called a previously
undisclosed witness to testify that she was a non-union employee who was
allegedly terminated from employment on a job she could still medically
243. Id. at 311.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 312 (citing TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 8301c, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1990)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 313.
248. 763 S.W.2d 529 (rex. App.-El Paso 1988), writ granted, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 610(Sept. 20, 1989). The supreme court granted writ in part to consider whether allowing the
testimony of a previously undisclosed witness was reversible error. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. . at 610.
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perform within one week of having filed a workers' compensation claim. Al-
varado presented no other evidence of a similar occurrence. Prior to that
undisclosed witness' testimony, Alvarado had not offered direct proof that
the filing of his workers' compensation claim was a determinative factor in
Farah's decision not to recall him. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for a new trial on the ground that Alvarado failed to prop-
erly supplement his answer to an interrogatory. 249 Alvarado then appealed
to the supreme court, and it granted his application for a writ of error.250
Whether a claim for retaliatory discharge under article 8307c of the
Workers' Compensation Act may be removed to a federal court with diver-
sity or federal question jurisdiction has received considerable attention.251
Where a plaintiff alleges a claim for retaliatory discharge under article
8307c, and he raises other claims arising under the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States, or where diversity exists between the plaintiff and
the defendant, the defendant will normally remove the entire case to federal
court. The federal district courts in Texas are split on the issue whether
removal of the article 8307c claim is proper.252
In Nabors v. City of.Arlington 253 Nabors, a state-certified law enforcement
officer, alleged that he suffered an on-duty injury and that the city termi-
nated his employment in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim. Nabors thus sued for damages and injunctive relief pursuant to arti-
cle 8307c for breach of contract and under federal law for violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.254 The city filed its petition for removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b). 255 Nabors argued that this case was improvidently removed be-
cause 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) prevented the removal of cases arising under the
Workers' Compensation Act.256 In response, the city argued that removal
was proper because 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) authorizes federal courts to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over all matters not otherwise within their original ju-
249. 763 S.W.2d at 535.
250. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 610 (Sept. 20, 1989).
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) provides: "A civil action in any State court arising under the
workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the
United States."
252. The following cases permitted removal of article 8307c claims: Gillis v. U.S. Natural
Resources, Inc., 4 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1259 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Richardson v.
Owens-Corning Glass Container, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex. 1988). In contrast, the
following cases have disallowed removal of article 8307c claims: Soto v. Tonka Corp., 716 F.
Supp. 977 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co., 708 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.
Tex. 1989); DeSantos v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., No. EP-86-CA-49 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 14,
1986); Fernandez v. Reynolds Metals Co., 384 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
253. 688 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (Nabors alleged that discharge deprived him of liberty and
property interests without procedural due process).
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.
256. For text of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), see supra note 251.
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risdiction.257 Relying upon American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,258 the
federal district court concluded that because Nabors sought relief for a single
wrong arising from an interlocked series of transactions, no separate and
independent claim or cause of action as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) ex-
isted.259 The court thus found that removal was not improper or without
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion and assumed
pendent jurisdiction over Nabor's article 8307c claim.26"
In Richardson v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, Ina 261 the federal district
court observed that Texas courts of appeals' decisions hold that a claim for
retaliatory discharge is separable from a compensation claim for accidental
injuries under the Workers' Compensation Act.262 The court in Richardson,
therefore, found that an article 8307c claim does not arise under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act as contemplated in 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). 26 3
In Gillis v. United States Natural Resources, Inc.264 the plaintiff sued his
former employer, United States Natural Resources, in state court for retalia-
tory discharge under article 8307c. United States Natural Resources re-
moved the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that
it was a citizen of Delaware and Washington, while the plaintiff was a citizen
of Texas. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court based on 28
U.S.C. § 1445(c). Recognizing the split of authority on the issue of remova-
bility of an article 8307c claim,265 the court chose to follow Richardson v.
Owens-Corning Glass Container, Inc., 266 and deny the plaintiff's motion to
remand, thereby retaining jurisdiction over the case.267
In Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevadoring Co.268 the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in
state court grounded solely under article 8307c of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act and raised no issue of federal law. Ryan-Walsh removed the case
from state court based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction.
257. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-remova-
ble claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district
court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
258. 341 U.S. 6 (1951) (adopting separate and independent claim or ause of action test for
removability).
259. 688 F. Supp. at 1167. The court observed that all of Nabor's claims arose from the
events surrounding his termination as a city police officer. Id.
260. Id. at 1168-69.
261. 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex. 1988). The court did not state the basis for removal to
federal court.
262. Id. at 673 (citing Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gaedcke Equip. Co., 716 S.W.2d 542, 543
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Artco-Bell Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 649 S.W.2d 722, 724 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1983, no writ)).
263. Id. at 674.
264. 4 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1259 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
265. Richardson v. Owens-Coming Glass Container, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (allowing removal of article 8307c claim). But cf. Fernandez v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
384 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (disallowing removal of article 8307c claim).
266. 698 F. Supp. at 673.
267. Id. at 674.
268. 708 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
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Wallace then filed a motion to remand the case to state court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1445(c). The district court stated that it could not sustain Ryan-
Walsh's removal on diversity grounds if Wallace's article 8307c action arose
under the Texas workers' compensation laws within the meaning of section
1445(C). 2 6 9 The court observed that the majority of district courts in other
jurisdictions considering whether various state law retaliatory discharge
claims ran afoul of section 1445(c) ordered remand.270 The court also ob-
served that the few cases denying motions to remand on section 1445(c)
grounds were distinguishable because the retaliatory discharge cause of ac-
tion at issue was not part of a statutory workers' compensation scheme in
those states.271 Noting the split of authority within the federal district
courts in Texas, the court disagreed with Richardson v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Container, Inc. 27 2 In Richardson the court relied upon Texas appellate court
decisions that separated retaliatory discharge claims from insurance com-
pensation claims for accidental injuries and, therefore, concluded that a
claim under article 8307c does not arise under the Workers' Compensation
Act for purposes of section 1445(c). 273 The Wallace court, however, ob-
served that the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have forcefully ruled
that federal, not state, law governs the construction of removal statutes.274
Consequently, the court held that federal law resolves the issue of whether a
civil action arises under state workers' compensation laws for purposes of
section 1445(c).275 Upon review of the meaning of "arising under" in the
context of section 1445(c) and several jurisdictional statutes, the court con-
cluded that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' definition was most appropriate:
"A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." 276 The court
noted that Wallace's article 8307c claim required an analysis of whether
Ryan-Walsh discharged him for exercising his rights under the Workers'
Compensation Act.277 Because the sole purpose of article 8307c is to insure
a full and meaningful exercise of rights provided for injured workers under
the Workers' Compensation Act, the court concluded that article 8307c is an
inextricable part of Texas' workers' compensation laws and would not exist
but for the Workers' Compensation Act.278 Applying Justice Holmes' defi-
269. Id. at 149.
270. Id. at 147 (citing Orsini v. Echlin, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. Inl. 1986); Alexander v.
Westinghouse Hittman Nuclear, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Roberts v. Citicorp
Diners Club, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 311 (D. Md. 1984); Kemp v. Dayton Tire Co., 435 F. Supp.
1062 (W.D. Okla. 1977)).
271. Id. (citing Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gaedcke Equip. Co., 716 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Artco-Bell Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
649 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, no writ)).
272. 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
273. Id. at 673-74.
274. 708 F. Supp. at 148 (quoting Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941);
(citing Paxton v. Weaver, 553 F.2d 936, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1977); C r . Zimmer, Inc., 565 F.
Supp. 1000, 1002 (E.D. La. 1983)).
275. Id. -.
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nition, the court held that an article 8307c lawsuit is a civil action arising
under the Texas' workers' compensation laws.279 Accordingly, the court
further held that Wallace's civil action under article 8307c arose under the
Texas workers' compensation laws and that section 1445(c) barred removal
of this case on diversity grounds.280
Subsequently, in Soto v. Tonka Corp.2 1 the federal district court took a
position consistent with Wallace. In Soto, Tonka removed Soto's article
8307c claim alleging the federal district court had original jurisdiction over
the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because of diversity of citizenship.
Tonka's notice of removal alleged it was a citizen of Minnesota. The court,
however, noted that Tonka, in its original answer, admitted that it was a
corporation formed and existing under the laws of Texas. 282 Further, Soto
had not pled for damages in excess of the $50,000 jurisdictional amount.
The pleadings, therefore, did not support removal on the basis of either di-
versity of citizenship or jurisdictional amount. While unnecessary to the dis-
position of the motion to remand, the court added that Soto's article 8307c
claim was within a category of cases specifically made non-removable pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). 283 Mistakenly relying upon Nabors v. City of
Arlington,2s4 which disallowed removal of an article 8307c claim under the
premise that civil rights and retaliatory discharge claims are not separate
and independent, and disregarding Richardson v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Container, Inc.,28 5 which narrowly applied article 8307c to allow removal,
the court held that a retaliatory discharge suit arising out of the Workers'
Compensation Act may not be removed. 28 6 The court considered its holding
consistent with the "salutary purpose of Congress to allow all cases relating
to a state's worker's compensation scheme to remain in state courts where
they belong." 287
The United States Supreme Court recently provided some guidance in this
area. In Northbrook National Insurance Co. v. Brewer288 Northbrook filed
an action in federal district court, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, to set aside a decision of the Industrial Accident
Board awarding certain workers' compensation benefits to Brewer. The dis-
trict court dismissed Northbrook's action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The district court concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) 289 mandates that
the employer's Texas citizenship be attributed to Northbrook, thus eliminat-
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. 716 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
282. Id. at 978.
283. Id. Retaliatory discharge suits are non-removable. See supra note 267.
284. 688 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
285. 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
286. 716 F. Supp. at 979.
287. Id. at 978-79.
288. 110 S. Ct. 297, 107 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1989).
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c) (1982) provides that "in any direct action against the insurer of a
policy... of liability insurance, ... such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which
the insured is a citizen. . .
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ing diversity between Northbrook and Brewer. 290 Relying upon its earlier
decision in Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,291 the Supreme Court
observed that section 1332 applies only to actions against insurers and does
not mention actions by insurers.292 While recognizing that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1445(c) ordinarily precludes removal of workers' compensation suits, the
Supreme Court, nevertheless, considered the apparent incongruity insuffi-
cient to necessitate expanding the scope of Congress' precise wording in sec-
tion 1332(c). 293
3. Claims Under the Right-to-Work Law&
In Hinote v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union,294 one
of the few cases interpreting Texas' right-to-work laws, 295 the jury awarded
Hinote, a union employee who crossed a picket line, $397,000 in actual dam-
ages and $785,000 in exemplary damages for injuries he and others received
during a bitter labor dispute. After the union's strike had lasted for approxi-
mately ten months, Hinote crossed the picket line because he believed that
the union was not working to resolve the strike. Shortly thereafter, Hinote's
wife received a telephone call at home threatening her husband and their
daughter. Hinote's wife received similar calls at her place of employment.
Hinote returned to work the next day and found a dummy, wearing clothes
identical to those which Hinote wore the day before, hanging from a hang-
man's noose on the gate. The sign on the dummy read "[t]his is what we do
to scabs." 296 The Hinote's home was also bombarded with small rocks and
ball bearings. Later Hinote's daughter found a large weight, called a
"deadman," in their driveway. In addition, Hinote was followed home on
numerous occasions. Finally, one day, as Hinote was leaving his home for
work, he was shot five times with a .22 caliber rifle-twice in the right leg,
290. 110 S. Ct. at 299, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 229.
291. 367 U.S. 348 (1961) (holding that Congress' elimination of removal jurisdiction over
workers' compensation suits did not withdraw original diversity jurisdiction over such suits).
292. 110 S. Ct. at 299, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 229.
293. Id. at 300, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 231.
294. 777 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
295. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a, § I (Vernon 1987) provides in part: "The
working man, unionist or non-unionist, must be protected. The right to work is the right to
live." Section 8(a) further provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor union, any labor organizer, any officer, any
agent or representative or any member of any labor union to collect, receive or
demand, directly or indirectly, any fee, assessment, or sum of money whatso-
ever, as a work permit or as a condition for the privilege to work from any
person not a member of the union; provided, however, this shall not prevent the
collection of initiation fees as above stated.
Id. art. 5154a, § 8. Section 14 also provides:
The provisions of this Act are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the
purposes expressed in the preamble and in such manner as to protect the rights
of laboring men to work and/or to organize for their mutual benefit in connec-
tion with their work; nor shall anything in this Act be construed to deny the free
rights of assembling, bargaining, and petitioning, orally or in writing with re-
spect to all matters affecting labor and employment.
Id. art. 5154a, § 14.
296. 777 S.W.2d at 137.
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once in the left knee, once in the abdomen, and once in the hand. After the
shooting, Hinote's wife continued to receive threatening telephone calls that
were traced to the residence of a union officer. Moreover, a plethora of testi-
mony further documented the extent of the union's violent activities. 297
Hildabridle, vice-chairman of the local union, admitted that his purpose
was to intimidate and antagonize union members who do not support union
decisions. Hildabridle also stated that Hinote was a "scab" and that "scabs
fire him up."' 298 Additionally, the union chaplain wrote a letter expressing
his opinion: "I don't believe it was a union man who shot [Hinote] in the
butt even though there are # lot of us who would like to have done it for
good reasons because of what he did by crossing his own picket line." 299 A
union member testified that when he was on picket duty, another union pick-
eter stated: "Something is going to happen to [Hinote]." 3°° On the morning
Hinote was shot, a union member drove by Hinote's home dressed in camou-
flage clothes and armed with guns, but he claimed that he was merely on his
way to a hunting trip.
Hinote sued the union for violation of his right to work and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hi-
note.30 1 The trial court, however, granted the union's motion for judgment,
notwithstanding the verdict, and rendered judgment for the union. Hinote
appealed.
Among other issues, the union, by way of cross-points, claimed violation
of the right to work was not a cause of action in tort. The court of appeals
disagreed. Relying upon Vasquez v. Bannworths, Inc., 30 2 the court stated
that the same principle that provides a company may not prevent an em-
ployee from working because of his union membership also applies to un-
ions.303 The court concluded that holding an employer liable for
discharging an employee because of union membership while not holding a
union liable for preventing, either physically or mentally, an employee who
crosses a picket line from working would be inconsistent.3 04 The union al-
leged that, under article 5154g, section 4 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes
297. A litany of the union's violent activities are detailed in the court's opinion. Id. at 136-
42.
298. Id. at 139.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 140.
301. The jury found that the union was negligent in its failure to "'discipline its members
and take action to deter violence or properly control or manage the strike related activity
during the work stoppage"' and thus awarded substantial damages to Hinote. Id. at 141.
302. 707 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1986). In Vasquez; the plaintiff was discharged because of her
union membership. Interpreting the purpose of article 5154 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes
Annotated and the Right to Work Statute, the supreme court held: "Those policies are to
prevent unlawful retaliation and discrimination because of membership or non-membership in
a union, and to protect employees in the exercise of their right of free choice to join or not join
a labor union." Id. at 888.
303. 777 S.W.2d at 142.
304. Id.
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Annonated,305 a violation of the statute was not a cause of action in tort.30 6
Nevertheless, Hinote's physical injury prompted the court to recognize his
tort claim.30 7 The court observed that its action effectuates the policies of
the statute by holding the union and its members accountable for the dam-
ages they caused by violating Hinote's right to work.308 Reversing the trial
court's judgment for the union, notwithstanding the jury's verdict, the court
of appeals noted that the jury obviously found the union ratified the violent
actions of its members, including the shooting. The union, as well as its
individual members, was thus responsible for these illegal acts.
4. Claims Under the Texas Employment Commission.
Upon an employee's termination of employment, the employee usually
seeks unemployment compensation benefits from the Texas Employment
Commission (TEC).309 Generally, when an employer challenges a former
employee's eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits, the
employer will allege that he or she discharged the former employee because
of misconduct.310 As defined in article 5221b, misconduct includes misman-
agement, neglect, intentional wrongdoing, or violation of a work rule.311
Parties frequently litigate the employee's violation of an employer's policy or
rule as a basis for claiming misconduct.312 During the past year, however,
305. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 5154g, § 4 (Vernon 1987) provides:
Any person, organization or association who violates any of the provisions of
this Act shall be liable to the person suffering therefrom for all resulting dam-
ages, and the person subjected to strike or picketing in violation of this Act is
given right of action to redress such wrong or damage, including injunctive re-
lief, and the District Courts of this State shall grant injunctive relief when a
violation of this Act is made to appear.
306. The court, relying upon Vasquez, stated that "[a]s long as the relief sought is 'fairly
inferable' from the pleadings, the court should design a remedy based on the relief sought,
which will effectuate the policies of the Act." 777 S.W.2d at 142 (quoting Vasquez v. Bunn-
sworths, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1986)).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b (Vernon 1987).
310. A person fails to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits if "he has been
discharged for misconduct connected with his last work." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
522lb-3(b) (Vernon 1987). Recently, in Beaumont v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 753
S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied), the court affirmed the TEC's
decision that an employee who gave premature notice of her job termination was ineligible to
receive unemployment benefits. Id. at 772.
311. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-17(q) (Vernon 1987) defines misconduct as:
mismanagement of a position of employment by action or inaction, neglect that
places in jeopardy the lives or property of others, intentional wrongdoing or
malfeasance, intentional violation of a law, or violation of a policy or rule
adopted to ensure orderly work and the safety of employees, but does not in-
clude an act of misconduct that is in response to an unconscionable act of an
employer or superior.
312. See Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 839 (Tex. 1986) (employer claiming inability to
perform duties satisfactorily as the employee's misconduct); see also Texas Employment
Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Fluids, 746 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied)(policy providing for urinalysis connected with drug testing); Burton v. Texas Employment
Comnm'n, 743 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied) (rule demanding em-
ployee make complaints to immediate supervisor); Lairson v. Texas Employment Comm'n,
742 S.W.2d 99, 100 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (company attendance policy re-
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the courts have addressed a myriad of issues interpreting the Unemployment
Compensation Act.
In Texas Employment Commission v. Tates313 the TEC denied unemploy-
ment benefits to Eddie Lee Tates upon a finding that he was discharged by
his employer for misconduct. Acknowledging that "'[i]nability to perform
to an employer's satisfaction is not misconduct within the meaning of the
Act,' "314 the TEC found: (1) Tates allowed his work to lapse into unsatis-
factory work after each counseling session; (2) the company had warned him
of possible discharge if his performance did not improve; (3) the company
discharged Tates after his work again became unsatisfactory; (4) Tates' mis-
management caused problems with customers; and (5) Tates' errors placed
his employer's property in jeopardy by causing ill will with customers that
could lead to loss of business. The TEC, therefore, found that Tates had the
ability to, and at times did, perform his duties satisfactorily, but that he
mismanaged his position by repeated negligence, thereby placing his em-
ployer's property in jeopardy.315 Upon a trial de novo, the district court
reversed the decision of the TEC. The court of appeals reversed the decision
of the district court and affirmed the TEC's finding of misconduct under the
substantial evidence standard of review. 316
In Beaumont v. Texas Employment Commission31 7 Joy Beaumont took a
temporary job with a company through a temporary service. Beaumont's
temporary job ended on a Friday, and she notified the temporary service of
her job's termination. Beaumont filed for unemployment benefits on the fol-
lowing Monday. The TEC denied Beaumont unemployment benefits for
failing to comply with the statute.318 The TEC concluded that Beaumont
left her last work voluntarily and without good cause; Beaumont appealed.
Based upon the substantial evidence standard of review, the trial court af-
firmed. On appeal, Beaumont claimed that the TEC's decision was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, but she did not challenge the legality or
reasonableness of the TEC's interpretation of the statute. Although the ap-
pellate court found the TEC's interpretation of the statute harsh and unfair,
it held that the TEC's decision was supported by substantial evidence and
quiring notice of being late or absent); Haas v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 683 S.W.2d 462,
463 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (store policy requiring identification before the selling
of alcohol).
313. 769 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
314. Id. at 292.
315. The evidence also reflected, however, that most of Tates' mistakes were favorable to
the customers and that while Tates did not intend to harm the company, "any error caused the
business financial harm." Id. Compare with Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830 (rex. 1986),
where the supreme court held that employer inconvenience or additional costs does not equate
with intentional mismanagement of duties nor with placing the lives or property of others injeopardy. Id. at 831; see also Lairson v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 742 S.W.2d 99, 101
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (mismanagement requires intent). _
316. 769 S.W.2d at 292-93.
317. 753 S.W.2d 770 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
318. TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-3(a) (Vernon 1987). According to the TEC's
interpretation of the statute, "a worker employed by a temporary service must report to the
temporary service after completing his or her final assignment and before filing for benefits."
753 S.W.2d at 771.
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affirmed the TEC's decision.319
The jurisdictional time limits for an employee to file for unemployment
compensation benefits, for an employer to respond to the filing, and for any
appeal during the administrative process are extremely critical. In Texas
Employment Commission v. Lewis320 the employer, J.C. Penney Company,
did not file its appeal of the TEC's initial determination within twelve days
after the date of the TEC notice of claim determination. Nevertheless, the
TEC permitted J.C. Penney to proceed with its appeal notwithstanding the
late notice of appeal; the TEC ultimately concluded that Jerry Lewis, the
claimant, was not entitled to unemployment compensation. On appeal, the
district court reversed the TEC's decision and held that the TEC lacked
jurisdiction to consider J.C. Penney's appeal of the TEC's initial determina-
tion. The court of appeals affirmed because J.C. Penney failed to present any
evidence that the notice of claim determination was not received in time to
make its appeal to the TEC;32 1 substantial evidence thus did not support the
TEC's determination that it had jurisdiction over J. C. Penney's appeal. 322
In Texas Employment Commission v. Southside Independent School Dis-
trict 323 the court of appeals had an opportunity to define who is unemployed
for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Albert Sendejo, a
substitute teacher for the school district, began rejecting calls from the dis-
trict to substitute because of personal reasons. Sendejo then filed with the
TEC a successful claim for unemployment benefits. The TEC record, how-
ever, showed that both the school district and Sendejo testified that Sendejo
was still employed by the district. On appeal, the district court reversed the
TEC's finding that Sendejo qualified for unemployment benefits. The court
of appeals affirmed. The court held: unemployed means that the employer-
employee relationship has terminated;324 and unemployed does not include
instances where the employee is merely idle during the term of the employ-
ment relationship.325
5. Claims Under the Whistleblower Act
Under the Texas Whistleblower Act,326 a state or local governmental
body may not suspend, terminate or otherwise discriminate against a public
employee because he reports, in good faith, a violation of law to an appropri-
319. Id. at 773. The court gave an example of the harshness of the TEC's ruling:
Assume that the temporary employee's work day ends at 5:00 p.m. Some time
prior to 5:00 p.m., the employee is informed that the temporary job will termi-
nate at 5:00 p.m. If the employee waits until 5:01 p.m. to notify the temporary
employment agency that the job is terminated, unemployment benefits are avail-
able. However, if notice is given at 4:59 p.m., unemployment benefits are not
available because of the present policy and rulings of TEC.
Id. at 772.
320. 777 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
321. Id. at 821 (citing TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-4(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990)).
322. Id. at 822.
323. 775 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
324. Id. at 735 (citing WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 2493 (3d ed. 1981)).
325. Id.
326. Tnx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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ate law enforcement authority. The Act does not apply to private sector
employees.327 If a public employee is discharged in violation of the Act, he
may recover actual damages, exemplary damages, court costs, reasonable
attorney's fees, reinstatement of employment, lost wages, and reinstatement
of any fringe benefits or seniority rights lost.328
In City of Ingleside v. Kneuper329 the City of Ingleside fired George
Kneuper from his job as Director of Public Works because he reported to
authorities what he believed to be criminal activity in connection with build-
ing inspections. Kneuper sued the city under the Whistleblower Act, and
the jury answered all questions in Kneuper's favor. On appeal, the city
raised several issues. First, the city argued that the absence of a finding of
malice, willful and wanton conduct, fraud, or gross negligence precluded an
award of $300,000 in exemplary damages. While the Act is silent on this
issue, the court found that the plain language of the Act does not indicate
legislative intent to omit the long-standing requirement that an award of
exemplary damages must be predicated on a finding of malice, willful and
wanton conduct, fraud, or gross negligence; 330 the court, therefore, set aside
the award of exemplary damages. 331 Second, the city complained that the
award of $75,000 for loss of future earning capacity and $108,000 for retire-
ment and other employee's benefits to which Kneuper would have been enti-
tled had he continued to work for the city was inconsistent with the court's
reinstatement of Kneuper to his former position; the city argued Kneuper
had thus received a double recovery for the same injury. The court held that
the award for loss of future earning capacity was not for future earnings, but
for earning capacity.332 Even where an employee returns to his former job
at the same salary, he may recover loss of earning capacity.333 The court
agreed, however, that reinstatement, together with the award of retirement
and other benefits Kneuper would have been entitled to had he continued to
work for the city, constituted a double recovery for the same injury.334 Hav-
ing sought and obtained an injunction returning Kneuper to his former posi-
tion, the court found that he irrevocably elected the remedy of reinstatement
and, therefore, struck the inconsistent monetary award.335
327. See Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 772 (rex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied).
328. TEx. Rv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
329. 768 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
330. Id. at 454-57.
331. Id. at 457.
332. Id. (no double recovery because actual, calculable earnings are different than future
earning capacity or future earning ability whether realized or not).
333. Id. (citing Thomas v. Jenkins, 481 S.W.2d 464 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Mikell v. La Beth, 344 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
334. Id. at 458.
335. Id. (citing Kingsbery v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 315 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The city also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting the jury's award of $50,000 for mental suffering in the past, $36,000 for mental suffer-
ing in the future, and $75,000 for the loss of future earning capacity. The court found the
evidence sufficient to support the jury's award of $75,000 for loss of future earning capacity
and $50,000 for past mental suffering. Id. at 459-60. The court, however, found the evidence
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In Travis County v. Colunga336 Colunga, a county parks employee, ob-
served violations of safety precautions in the use and storage of pesticides
and herbicides. Colunga reported the violations to her supervisors and sub-
mitted published materials concerning proper safety use of poisonous chemi-
cals. The employer harassed and then demoted Colunga; meanwhile the
unsafe practice remained unchanged. Colunga sought a meeting with the
precinct's county commissioner and asked a union official to also attend the
meeting. When Colunga arrived for the meeting, the union official and the
county commissioner were arguing, and the meeting did not transpire.
Colunga was subsequently fired. Colunga then reported the violations to the
Texas Department of Agriculture; the Department inspected and found vio-
lations. Colunga filed suit under the Whistleblower's Act, and the jury
awarded her $20,000 in actual damages, $30,000 in exemplary damages, and
$11,000 in attorney's fees. On appeal, the county argued that Colunga did
not report the violations to an appropriate law enforcement authority as re-
quired by the Act;" 337 the county claimed that the county commissioner was
not the appropriate authority. The court of appeals disagreed and found
that the legislature intended a more elastic reading of the word "appropri-
ate."' 338 The court held that the county commissioner, through his connec-
tion to the Travis County Commissioners Court, had the authority to
inquire into the safety violations reported by Colunga. 339
6. Claims Under Juror Retaliation Statute.
Under the Texas Juror Retaliation statute34° a private employer may not
terminate a permanent employee because the employee serves as a juror.341
If an employee is terminated for this reason, the employee will be entitled to
reinstatement at the same level of employment he enjoyed before jury duty,
so long as the employee gives the employer notice that he intends to return
after jury duty.342 An employee who is successful in his suit is also entitled
to damages not to exceed an amount equal to six months' compensation, 343
and reasonable attorney's fees.344
In Wright v. Faggan 345 Faggan was a full-time employee at defendant's
fast food franchise when she received a summons for jury duty. Faggan
showed the summons to the manager so that she could get time off from
work.346 Her manager told her to remind him that she had jury duty, but
factually and legally insufficient to support the jury's award of $36,000 for future mental suf-
fering. Id. at 461.
336. 753 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied).
337. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
338. 753 S.W.2d at 719.
339. Id. at 720.
340. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN. §§ 122.001-.002 (Vernon 1986).
341. Id. § 122.001(a).
342. Id. § 122.001(b).
343. Id. § 122.002(a).
344. Id. § 122.002(b).
345. 773 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1989, writ denied).
346. Ms. Faggan was aware that she fell under a statutory provision that would probably
excuse her from jury duty, but felt she should appear to claim the excuse.
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Faggan forgot to call him on that day until three hours after her shift began.
After Faggan was excused from jury duty pursuant to a statutory exemp-
tion,347 she returned to the franchise to tell her manager that she would
report to work as soon as she changed into her uniform.348 The manager
told her not to return to work until the next day. On the next day, he put
Faggan off again and told her to return the next day. When Faggan re-
turned on the third day, she presented the manager with a copy of the juror
retaliation statute, but the manager discharged her nonetheless. Faggan
then sued her employer pursuant to the statute. The employer argued that
the statute did not apply because Faggan violated its no call/no show/no
work policy and that her discharge was unrelated to her court appearance.
In the alternative, the employer argued that the statute was inapplicable be-
cause Faggan did not actually serve as a juror. At trial, the employer pro-
duced evidence that Faggan was a poor worker and that she violated its
policy regarding absences without prior notice. The jury, however, found
that the manager terminated Faggan for serving as a juror. The employer
appealed alleging that the trial court erred in failing to request the jury to
determine whether Faggan was discharged solely because she served as a
juror. The employer further alleged that the statute did not apply to Faggan
because she did not actually serve as a juror. The court of appeals held that
the statute does not prohibit termination solely for jury service; jury service
is sufficient, however, if it is a reason. 349 The court of appeals also held that
the statute applies to persons appearing to claim an exemption even if they
do not actually serve on a jury.350
In Fuchs v. Lifetime Doors, Inh, 351 a diversity suit, Lifetime Doors alleg-
edly terminated Bonnie Fuchs from her employment for serving on a civil
jury. She sought lost wages, medical and insurance benefits, punitive dam-
ages, and attorney's fees. Lifetime Doors moved for partial summary judg-
ment on the basis that Fuchs' recovery must be limited to six months'
compensation, calculated at the rate Fuchs was compensated at the time of
her termination. The federal district court granted Lifetime Door's motion
for partial summary judgment;35 2 the court recognized that while the intent
of the statute was to create an exception to the employment-at-will rule, it
also limits the damages recoverable to an amount equal to six month's com-
pensation at the rate which the employer compensated the person when
summoned for jury duty.353 The court observed that generally compensa-
tion is the salary paid and any benefits received. 354 Therefore, if Fuchs was
347. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 62.106(2) (Vernon 1988).
348. By informing her manager of her intent to return to work, Faggan satisfied the re-
quirement in TEx. Civ. PRAc. REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001(b) (Vernon 1986).
349. 773 S.W.2d at 353.
350. Id. at 354. The court justified its holding by stating that "this activity requires an
absence from work, and as such, an employee should not be made to fear termination for
making such an appearance." Id.
351. 717 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (interpreting Texas law).
352. Id. at 467.
353. Id. (citing TEx. Cxv. PRAc. & RaM. CoDnE ANN. § 122.001(a) (Vernon 1986)).
354. 717 F. Supp. at 467; see I.R.C. § 105 (1982).
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entitled to recover under the statute, she would be entitled to recover six
months of her salary and six months of any accumulated benefits.355
Z New Statutes Affecting the Employment Relationship.
The Seventy-First Texas Legislature amended the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act effective September 1, 1989, to replace the term handicap
with the term disability.356 "Disability" is defined as "a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity or a rec-
ord of such mental or physical impairment."'3 "7 Excluded from the defini-
tion of disability are persons with a current alcohol or drug addiction and
persons "with a currently communicable disease, but not limited to acquired
immunity deficiency syndrome or infection with a human immunodeficiency
virus, that constitutes a direct threat to the health or safety of other persons
or that makes the affected person unable to perform the duties of the per-
son's employment. s358 Therefore, it is unlawful for an employer to dis-
ciminate against a disabled person in making decisions to hire, discharge or
in any other decisions effecting the disabled person's terms and conditions of
employment. 35 9 While there are no cases defining the term disabled person,
one may assume that the courts' interpretation will encompass a greater
number of persons that the definition of handicapped persons.360
The legislature amended the Human Resources Code effective September
1, 1989,361 requiring nursing homes, custodial care homes, adult day care or
health care facilities, and facilities for the mentally retarded to conduct crim-
inal conviction checks on potential employees who would be in direct con-
tact with a consumer of health care services. 362 Employers must provide the
Department of Human Resources (DHR) with identifying information
about the applicant, and the DHR will then request the Department of Pub-
lic Safety or the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide the criminal con-
viction records. 363 The Department of Public Safety may provide to the
DHS, the Department of Health or the prospective employer criminal con-
viction records involving (1) a misdemeanor or felony classified as an offense
against the person or the family; (2) a misdemeanor or felony classified as
public indecency; (3) a felony violation of a statute relating to control, pos-
session, or distribution of a substance included in the Texas Controlled Sub-
stances Act; (4) a felony violation of Section 31.03 of the Texas Penal Code
355. Id. at 467-68. Because Fuchs had not been deprived of any benefits, she would not be
entitled to recover lost benefits if successful in her suit. Id. at 468.
356. (Vernon Supp. 1990).
357. Id. § 2.01(4).
358. Id. § 2.01(4)(A) & (B).
359. Id. § 5.01(1) & (2).
360. Cf. Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316-18 (Tex. 1987) (supreme court
construed definition of handicapped person to include only serious impairments).
361. TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 106.001-.012 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
362. Id. §§ 106.002-.003.
363. Id. § 106.003.
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(theft);364 (5) robbery or aggravated robbery; or (6) burglary.3 65 If the state
has convicted an applicant or employee of any of the above offenses, he must
be denied employment or, if employed, he must be discharged,366 unless he
falls within certain enumerated exceptions. 367 The statute further provides
that the records are privileged 368 and that an unauthorized disclosure of the
records or the information contained in the records is a second degree fel-
ony.369 The criminal conviction investigation is not necessary for applicants
who are licensed under other laws, such as nurses and nursing home admin-
istrators,370 presumably because the license procedure provides security.
An employer, an officer or employee of a facility responsible for performing
this investigation is not civilly liable for failure to comply with this law so
long as the investigator acts in good faith. 371
Effective September 1, 1989, the legislature amended the Penal Code to
provide criminal penalties if a public servant acting under color of his office
or employment intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. 372 An
offense under this statute is a class A misdemeanor. 373
The Seventy-First Texas Legislature also passed legislation pertinent to
the discharge or penalizing of an employee for compliance with a sub-
poena.374 Under the Act, effective September 1, 1989, an employer may not
discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize an employee because the em-
ployee complies with a valid subpoena to appear in a civil, criminal, legisla-
tive, or administrative proceeding375. If an employer violates the act in
relation to a subpoena issued by a court, the court may hold the employer in
contempt.376 Additionally, if the employer violates the Act in relation to a
subpoena issued by a legislative committee or a state agency, the authority
may fine the employer an amount not to exceed $500. 377 If an employee is
discharged in violation of the act, he is entitled to reinstatement to the same
364. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 1989).
365. TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 106.003(b)(l)-(5).
366. Id. § 106.008(a).
367. Id. § 106.008(b)-(c) (exceptions include evidence of drug rehabilitation and any of-
fenses occupying ten years ago or more).
368. Id. § 106.009(a).(b).
369. Id. § 106.010(a)-(b). A second degree felony is punishable by confinement in the
Texas Department of Corrections for any term of not more than twenty years or less than two
years. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33 (Vernon 1974). In addition to imprisonment, an
individual may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. Id.
370. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 106.004(b).
371. Id. § 106.011.
372. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Under the Penal Code, "sex-
ual harassment" is defined as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition
of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explic-
itly or implicitly." Id. § 39.02(c).
373. Id. § 12.21 (Vernon 1974) (provides that "[aln individual adjudged guiltyof a Class A
misdemeanor shall be punished by: (1) a fine not to exceed $2,000; (2) confinemefit in jail for a
term not to exceed one year; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment").
374. Tax. Civ. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1990).
375. Id. art. 5207c(a).




job if he, as soon as practical after release from compliance with the sub-
poena, gives his employer actual notice that he intends to return to work.378
In addition to reinstatement, an employee may also recover damages in an
amount not to exceed six months' compensation at the rate at which the
employer compensated the employee when the court issued the subpoena,
plus reasonable attorney's fees.379 However, an employer may raise as a de-
fense that re-employment is impossible or unreasonable because of the
change in the employer's circumstances while the employee complied with
the subpoena.3 80
II. EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT AND
PREEMPTION OF TEXAS COMMON LAW CLAIMS
The primary purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),381 originally enacted in 1974, is to protect the interests of partici-
pants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries. Accordingly, ERISA
requires disclosure and reporting, establishes certain fiduciary standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation, and authorizes appropriate penalties
against employers, trustees, and other entities who fail to comply with its
mandates. 38 2 With respect to employment status, ERISA strictly prohibits
discharging an employee under certain circumstances. 383
The United States Supreme Court defined the breadth and impact of the
ERISA preemption doctrine in two unanimous decisions: Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Taylor 384 and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.38 5 In
those decisions, the Supreme Court expressly held that the preemption
clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as
they relate to any employee benefit plan, except state laws that regulate in-
surance. 386 Recognizing that the preemption provisions of ERISA are delib-
erately expansive, the Supreme Court observed that Congress provides
explicit direction that ERISA preempts common law causes of action filed in
state court.387
The Fifth Circuit recently addressed the question of whether a state law
relates to an employee benefit plan so as to be preempted by ERISA. In
Cefalu v. B. F Goodrich Co. 38 8 the plaintiff, Cefalu, began working for
Goodrich in 1959, and during his employment he participated in the Good-
378. Id. art. 5207c(c).
379. Id. art. 5207c(d)(1)-(d)(2).
380. Id. art. 5207c(e).
381. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
382. Id. § 1001(b).
383. Id. § 1140. Under ERISA, an employer cannot discharge an employee "for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such [employee] may become
entitled under.,the plan ....
384. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
385. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
386. 481 U.S. at 44-45. There are limited exceptions to this general rule. See, eg., 29
U.S.C. §§ 1003(b), 1144 (1982).
387. 781 U.S. at 44-45.
388. 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
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rich retirement program. In 1985, Goodrich entered into an agreement with
a third party to sell all of its assets in the division employing Cefalu. Good-
rich advised Cefalu that his employment with Goodrich would terminate on
December 31, 1985 and offered him the opportunity to obtain employment
with the third party and continue his benefits under the ERISA plan.
Rather than work for the third party, Cefalu chose to purchase a franchise
to operate a Goodrich retail center. Cefalu claimed that representatives of
Goodrich orally assured him that his retirement benefits as a franchisee
would be identical to those of employees who had accepted jobs with the
third party. After purchasing the franchise, Goodrich allegedly advised
Cefalu that his retirementbenefits would not be the same as those received
by employees of the third party. Cefalu then filed a suit alleging, inter alia, a
claim for breach of contract.
Goodrich timely removed the suit to federal court and moved for sum-
mary judgment asserting that ERISA preempted Cefalu's state law claim for
breach of contract. The district court granted Goodrich's motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal, Cefalu argued that his breach of contract claim
did not relate to the ERISA plan. More specifically, Cefalu contended that
he did not sue the ERISA plan but merely sued Goodrich in its capacity as
his former employer. The Fifth Circuit stated that state law preemption is
determined by whether the claim relates to a benefit plan.389 Further, "the
question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of
congressional intent. ' 390 Relying upon Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Ina,3 91 Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux392 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Taylor,393 the Fifth Circuit found that Cefalu's claim related to ERISA and
stated that the express language of section 1144(a),394 its legislative history,
and the jurisprudence establish that ERISA preempted Cefalu's state law
contract claim.395 The court observed that Congress intended the ERISA
preemption provision to have an expansive reach.396
ERISA also provides that, except for actions under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 397 the district courts of the United States shall have exclu-
389. Id. at 1293.
390. Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)).
391. 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (state human rights laws preempted by ERISA if they prohibit
practices lawful under federal law).
392. 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (common law cause of action for improper processing of claim for
benefits under ERISA relate to and are preempted by ERISA).
393. 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (common law action filed in state court preempted by ERISA even
if such preemption not obvious).
394. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) provides that with certain exceptions "this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws.insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan ...."
395. 871 F.2d at 1295; see Lee v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 894 F.2d 755, 758 (5th
Cir. 1990) (state law claims for fraud and misrepresentation preempted); Degan v. Ford Motor
Co., 869 F.2d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir. 1989) (state claim for oral contract preempted).
396. 871 F.2d at 1293.
397. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1982) provides: "A civil action may be brought (1) by a
participant or beneficiary... (B) to recover benefits... [or] to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan ...."
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
sive jurisdiction. 398 For cases arising under section 1132(a)(1)(B), the state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 399 Upon discharge from employment,
plaintiffs often file a lawsuit in state court alleging wrongful discharge and
denial of pension and other benefits. If and when removal occurs under ER-
ISA, plaintiffs argue that the state court has concurrent jurisdiction over
their claims. Federal courts, however, have universally concluded that alle-
gations of wrongful discharge for exercising any right to an employee benefit
plan do not fall within the ambit of the concurrent jurisdiction clause, but,
rather, such allegations fall within the exclusive jurisdiction clause of 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 400 Therefore, where a plaintiff alleges wrongful dis-
charge to deprive him of pension and benefit plans, federal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the case.4° 1
In a case similar to Cefalu v. B. F Goodrich Co.4°2 the Dallas court of
appeals held that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' suit to enforce an oral
agreement. In E-Systems, Inc. v. Taylor4°3 the plaintiffs alleged that a repre-
sentative of the employer orally promised that they would receive retirement
benefits at a greater rate than originally calculated. Claiming that their
cause of action was entirely independent of ERISA, the plaintiffs alleged that
their suit was simply one to enforce an oral agreement to pay additional
monthly retirement benefits. Relying upon Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux4° 4 the court observed that "the pre-emption provisions of ERISA
are deliberately expansive, designed to establish pension plan regulation as
exclusively a federal concern." 4 5 Because of the sweeping scope of the pre-
emption section, the court held that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs'
claim. 4° 6 Finally, the court held that because ERISA preemption concerned
the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, once the court
determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it was re-
quired to reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case.4 7
The San Antonio court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Cadillac
Insurance Co. v. L.P.C. Distribution Co.4°8 In Cadillac the plaintiffs sued
seeking damages in connection with an alleged wrongful cancellation of their
employer group insurance contract. The plaintiffs' pleadings alleged com-
398. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982).
399. Id.
400. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982) provides: "A civil action may be brought (3) by a par-
ticipant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this subchapter... or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief .... "
401. See Ziffv. American Tel. & Tel., 799 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1989); West v. Butler, 621
F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980); Braun v. Levitt, No. 86-3348 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1986); Cowden v.
Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp. 740, 745-46 (S.D. Ohio 1984);
Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 534 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D. 11. 1982), modified, 701 F.2d 1238
(7th Cir. 1983); McGinnis v. Joyce, 507 F. Supp. 654, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bittner v. Sadoff&
Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 535 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
402. 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
403. 744 S.W.2d 956 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
404. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
405. 744 S.W.2d at 958.
406. Id. at 959-60.
407. Id. at 960.
408. 770 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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mon law and statutory causes of action under state law for violating the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), article 21.21 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code,410 and the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court noted
that the plaintiffs' pleadings clearly alleged that the claims relate to an em-
ployee insurance plan for the benefit of the employees; that the employer
who was engaged in commerce established and maintained the plan; and
that the designated plan administrator was the co-defendant.411 Thus, on
the face of the pleadings, the court held that ERISA preempted the plain-
tiffs' claims unless they fell within the savings clause of ERISA.412 Because
the plaintiffs did not invoke the ERISA savings clause in their petition, the
court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.413 Further, the court
disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that even if ERISA preempted their
state law claims the defendant waived the preemption by not raising it as an
affirmative defense.414 Relying upon Gorman v. Life Insurance Co. of North
America,415 the court reiterated that a claim of federal preemption is a chal-
lenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction that could not be waived.4 16
Despite the United States Supreme Court's broad interpretation of ER-
ISA's preemption provisions and the wrongful discharge provision,4 17 the
Texas Supreme Court created a new exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine which runs afoul of ERISA.418 In McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., McClendon, claimed that Ingersoll-Rand discharged him from his em-
ployment simply to escape its obligation to contribute to his pension fund.
McClendon alleged three claims: (1) breach of his employment contract, (2)
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. McClendon stated in his petition that
his retirement benefits would have vested if he had continued his employ for
four more months. The trial court granted Ingersoll-Rand's motion for
summary judgment which the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court
held that the written compensation agreement McClendon relied upon did
not modify his at-will employment.419 Distinguishing Benoit v. Polysar Gulf
409. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1989).
410. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
411. 770 S.W.2d at 894.
412. Id. The savings clause provides that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
413. 770 S.W.2d at 895.
414. Id.
415. 752 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), writ granted, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 40 (1989).
416. 770 S.W.2d at 895.
417. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
418. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (rex. 1989), cert granted, 58
U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1990) (No. 89-1298). The exception "allows recovery when the
plaintiff proves that the principal reason for his termination was the employer's desire to avoid
contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension fund." Id. at 71.
419. The agreement contained a clause stating the" 'agreement is subject to change, at any
time, by the Company without prior written notice."' 757 S.W.2d at 818.
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Coast, Inc. ,420 and citing with approval Webber v. M. W Kellogg Co.,421 the
appellate court held that employment is at will unless a writing specifically
states otherwise.422
Acknowledging that the state has an interest in protecting employees' in-
terests in pension plans, the supreme court in McClendon nevertheless cre-
ated an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.423 The supreme court
based its conclusion upon Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center,424 a New York
federal district court decision that recognized a cause of action under New
York law for wrongful discharge when an employer discharges an employee
because the employee is approaching retirement age and the employer
wishes to reduce its obligations under the company pension plan.425 The
employer and the court in Hovey, however, failed to raise in any manner
ERISA or ERISA preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1140. By way of a foot-
note, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that two other federal district
court decisions have held that ERISA preempted a claim for wrongful dis-
charge to avoid the payment of pension funds.426 The supreme court, how-
ever, distinguished those decisions because McClendon acknowledged in his
brief to the court of appeals that he was not seeking lost pension benefits, but
was instead seeking lost future wages, mental anguish, and punitive damages
resulting from the wrongful discharge. 427 Nevertheless, given the deliber-
ately expansive preemption provisions of ERISA, a plaintiff's attempt to cir-
cumvent ERISA by artfully pleading a McClendon cause of action may
prove futile. Under clear United States Supreme Court authority, a plaintiff
may not avoid ERISA preemption by carefully crafting his petition.428 Even
if it is doubtful whether state courts have jurisdiction to ajudicate disputes
such as McClendon's claims, defendants need only remove to federal court
and raise a defense of preemption. 429
420. 728 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
421. 720 S.W.2d 124 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e) (holding
employment is at-will unless a writing specifies to the contrary).
422. 757 S.W.2d at 818.
423. 779 S.W.2d at 71.
424. 516 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. N.Y. 1981).
425. Id. at 70-71.
426. 779 S.W.2d at 71 n.3 (citing Pratt v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 991 (D. Md.
1987); Cahall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1986)).
427. Id.
428. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987).
429. 779 S.W.2d at 72-73 (Cook, J., dissenting, joined by Phillips, C.J., Hecht, 3.); see also
Rose v. Intelogic Trace, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Tex. 1987). The plaintiffs in Rose
originally alleged in Texas state court that the defendant terminated their employment in an
attempt to avoid the vesting of their retirement benefits, vacation benefits, and other company
benefits. The plaintiffs subsequently amended their original petition in state court to exclude
any reference to retirement benefits, while continuing to allege that defendant terminated them
in an attempt to avoid the payment of vacation benefits and other company benefits. The court
stated that their artful pleading did not alter the result:
A plaintiff cannot rob a district court of jurisdiction by electing to amend away
the grounds for federal jurisdiction. Even though plaintiffs did not refer to ER-
ISA in their state petition, their claim that they were terminated by defendant in
an attempt to deprive them of company retirement benefits is a claim preempted
by ERISA, and removal is proper.
Id. at 1330-31.
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III. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE'S TURN
Since the supreme court's decisions in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Ina,430
Bergman v. Norris of Houston,431 DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,432 and Mar-
tin v. Credit Protection Association,433 employees who have signed noncom-
petition agreements have continued to challenge the agreements434 based
upon the Hill criteria435 for evaluating the reasonableness of the agreement.
In DeSantis, which also involved a choice of law issue, the supreme court
430. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
431. 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987).
432. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616 (July 13, 1988) (motion for rehearing pending). Since this
article was sent to the publisher, the supreme court rendered its decisions on motion for re-
hearing in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. . 517 (June 6, 1990) and Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 546 (June 6, 1990). In both cases the covenants
not to compete were held unenforceable. DeSantis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 525; Martin, 33 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. at 532. The supreme court also held the covenant not to compete unenforceable in
Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 530, 532 (June 6,
1990), and denied the application for a writ of error in Bland v. Henry & Peters, 763 S.W.2d 5
(rex. App.-Tyler 1988), writ denied, 33 Tex. Sup. CL J. 510 (June 6, 1990), where the court
of appeals reluctantly held that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable. 763 S.W.2d at
8. In DeSantis, Martin, and Juliette Fowler Homes, the supreme court held that it was unnec-
essary to determine whether the Covenants Not to Compete Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.
§ 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1990), applied to the cases because the court opined that the statute
would not require a different result. DeSantis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 525-26 & n.7; Martin, 33
Tex. Sup. Ct. . at 547, n.1; Juliette Fowler Homes, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 532 n.6.
433. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626 (July 13, 1988) (motion for rehearing pending). See n.432.
434. Since the Hill decision and prior to the Covenants Not to Compete Act, covenants not
to compete have been held enforceable in the following cases: Posey v. Monier Resources,
Inc., 768 S.W.2d 915, 918-19 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, writ denied); French v. Commu-
nity Broadcasting of Coastal Bend, Inc., 766 S.W.2d 330, 333-34 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.); B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 781, 784
(rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Bertotti v. C. E. Shepherd Co., Inc., 752 S.W.2d
648, 655 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); M.R.S. Datascope, Inc. v. Ex-
change Data Corp., 745 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1988, no writ);
Clohset v. Joseph Chris Personnel Servs., Inc., No. C14-87-00387-CV (Tex. App-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837, 840
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp., 739 S.W.2d 460,
464 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied); Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636, 640
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
Covenants not to compete, however, were held unenforceable in the following cases: Mar-
tin, 33 Tex. Sup. CL J. at 548; Juliette Fowler Homes, 33 Tex. Sup. CL J. at 532; DeSantis, 33
Tex. Sup. CL J. at 525; Spicer v. Tacito & Assocs., 783 S.W.2d 220, 221-22 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ); Cukjati v. Burkett, 772 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
no writ); Ilona of Hungary, Inc. v. Ronaszeki, No. C14-88-00501-CV (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (not yet published); Bland v. Henry & Peters, 763 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied); Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polak-
off, 752 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear, Nose &
Throat Assocs., 751 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ); Orkin Extermi-
nating Co. v. Resurrection, 740 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
435. Under Hill, a covenant not to compete must meet four broad requirements to repre-
sent a reasonable covenant: (1) the covenant must be necessary for the protection of the em-
ployer, i.e., the employer must have a legitimate interest in protecting business goodwill or
trade secrets; (2) the covenant must not be oppressive to the employee, i.e., limitations as to
time, territory, and activity must be reasonable; (3) the'covenant must not be injurious to the
public by preventing competition or by depriving the community of needed goods; and (4) the
employer must give consideration for something of value, i.e., the employer must impart spe-
cial training or knowledge to the employee. 725 S.W.2d at 170-71. The court also determined
that a covenant is unenforceable if it limits competition or restrains the right to engage in a
common calling. Id. at 172.
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concluded that the fundamental Texas public policy promoting free move-
ment of workers in the job market prevented the court from enforcing Flor-
ida law which recognized that noncompetition agreements are
enforceable. 436 Since the supreme court's decision in DeSantis, the Texas
Legislature has reacted quickly to redefine public policy regarding covenants
not to compete.
The Seventy-First Texas Legislature overruled Hill and its progeny and
re-established Texas law governing noncompetition agreements with the pas-
sage of the Covenants Not to Compete Act.437 Further, with the enactment
of an amendment to the Texas Business & Commerce Code,438 the legisla-
ture established the criteria for enforceability of covenants not to compete
and the procedures and remedies in such enforcement actions.439 The legis-
lature also reversed the supreme court's presumption that the public policy
of Texas is against the enforcement of noncompetition agreements except
under certain limited circumstances,440 by enacting a statute designed to en-
force such agreements. 441 The public policy as expressed by the legislature is
the antipode of the supreme court's expression of public policy." 2
The legislative history of the Covenants Not to Compete Act clearly dem-
onstrates443 that the legislature concurred with Justice Paul S. Colley of the
Tyler court of appeals. This court considered Hill and its progeny contrary
to sound common law principles.4 " The legislature's swift reaction to Hill,
Bergman, DeSantis and Martin indicates the public also preferred the sound,
common-law principles that had developed prior to the supreme court's de-
cision in Hill.445 The legislation represents a return to twenty-seven years of
436. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 619 (citing Fla. Stat. § 652.33 (1988)).
437. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
438. Id. §§ 15.50-.51.
439. Id.
440. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 618; French v. Community Broadcasting of Coastal
Bend, Inc., 766 S.W.2d 330, 335 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
441. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-.51.
442. The Covenants Not to Compete Act: Hearings on H.B. 1026 Before the House Comm.
on Bus. & Com., 71st Leg. I (Mar. 20, 1989) (author of H.B. 1026, Representative Terral R.
Smith, stated public policy favors enforcement of covenants not to compete).
443. See id.; The Covenants Not to Compete Act: Hearings on Tex. &B. 946 Before the
Senate Comm. on Economic Dev., 71st Leg. (Apr. 3, 1989).
444. Bland v. Henry & Peters, 763 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ). Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Colley lamented the supreme court's decisions:
[I]t seems clear that the opinions in Hill, Bergman, DeSantis, and Martin have
effectively repudiated long-honored, common-law principles relating to consid-
eration as applied to the law of contracts in cases involving post-employment
covenants not to compete, or covenants and promises which limit an employee's
right to compete with his former employer. We disagree with the Supreme
Court's apparent abolition of these sound common-law principles, as well as its
disregard of the distinction between a restraint which forbids competition and
one which only operates to prevent the employee, for a reasonable period of
time, from diverting the clients or customers of his former employer. Neverthe-
less, it is our duty to adhere to that Court's law pronouncements.
Id. Justice Colley's opinion was quoted during testimony at a hearing before the Senate Com-
mittee on Economic Development. See The Covenants Not to Compete Act: Hearings on Tex.
S.B. 946 Before the Senate Comm. on Economic Dev., 71st Leg. 1 (Apr. 5, 1989).
445. The Covenants Not to Compete Act: Hearings on H.B. 1026 Before the House Comm.
on Bus. & Com., 71st Leg. 1 (Mar. 20, 1989) (statement of author of H.B. 1026, Representative
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Texas common law prior to Hill beginning with the supreme court's decision
in Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell.4" Recognizing the importance of
this legislation, the statute became effective August 28, 1989, and it applies
to any covenant entered into before, on, or after August 28, 1989.447.
The Covenants Not to Compete Act codifies the criteria for the enforce-
ability of noncompetition agreements, provides a shifting burden of proof,
and requires the courts to reform otherwise enforceable noncompetition
agreements that are unreasonable as to the scope of the activity to be re-
strained or as to the time or geographic limitations imposed.448 A covenant
not to compete should be ancillary to an independently enforceable agree-
ment, for example an employment contract; otherwise the promisor (em-
ployee) must receive separate consideration." 9 If the covenant meets these
section 15.50(1) criteria, but is unreasonable as to time, territory, or scope of
activity limitations under section 15.50(2), and the promisee (employer) re-
quests that the covenant be reformed, the court "shall reform the covenant
to the extent necessary to cause the covenant to meet the criteria specified by
subdivision (a) of section 15.50 and enforce the covenant as reformed
"450
The burden of proving the reasonableness of a covenant not to compete
depends upon the nature of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary.
In personal service contracts, the promissee must prove the reasonableness
of the covenant.451 By contrast, in contracts not involving personal services,
such as contracts for the sale of a business, partnership agreements, and
Terral R. Smith); L Gray, Business Law Section Council Meeting, Texas State Bar Conven-
tion (June 29, 1989) (drafter's commentary to Tex. S.B. 946).
446. 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960).
447. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 15.50-.51 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
448. Id.
449. Section 15.50 of the Act provides that a covenant not to compete is enforceable to the
extent that it:(1) is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement but, if the covenant not to
compete is executed on a date other than the date on which the underlying
agreement is executed, such covenant must be supported by independent valua-
ble consideration; and
(2) contains reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of
activity to be restrained that do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary
to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.
Id. § 15.50(1) & (2). The "ancillary to" requirement in § 15.50(1) is consistent with the
supreme court's decision in Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973) holding "con-
tracts which are in reasonable restraint of trade must be ancillary to and in support of another
contract." Id. at 683. The rationale for the reasonableness test in § 15.50(2) was first set forth
in Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960):[Tihe test usually stated for determining the validity of the covenant as written
is whether it imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably
necessary to protect the business and good will of the employer .... The period
of time during which the restraint is to last and the territory that is included are
important factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
agreement.
Id. at 312-13, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
450. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990). This section is con-
sistent with the Weatherford decision. 161 Tex. at 314, 340 S.W.2d at 953 (if agreement is
unreasonable until reformed, promisee entitled to injunctive relief and not damages).
451. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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leases, the promisor must prove that the covenant is unreasonable.452
In the context of a personal service contract, if the promisor proves that
the promisee (employer) knew at the time of entering into the noncompeti-
tion agreement that its limitations were unreasonable under section 15.50(2),
and the promisee seeks to enforce the agreement to a greater extent than
necessary to protect its goodwill or other business interest, the court may
award attorney's fees and court costs to the promisor if the promisor suc-
cessfully defends the enforcement action.453 If the court reforms the limita-
tions, the promisee is only entitled to injunctive relief and not damages.454
If, however, the noncompetition agreement is enforced as written, then a
court may award the promisee damages, injunctive relief, or both for a
breach by the promisor of the agreement. 455
In addition to substantially modifying the Hill criteria, the Covenants Not
to Compete Act eliminates the common calling exception to the enforcement
of noncompetition agreements.456 It also eliminates the special training or
knowledge requirement to establish consideration for the agreement. 457 Fi-
nally, a court's subjective opinion that the agreement limits competition will
not render the agreement unenforceable; rather, section 15.5 1(c) requires the
court to reform the agreement to make it reasonable under section
15.50(2). 4 58
IV. DRUG TESTING AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
In Texas EmploymentCommission v. Hughes Drilling Fuids459 Hughes
Drilling discharged an employee, Bodessa, for refusing to sign a written con-
sent form and to submit a urine sample for a drug screening test as required
by company policy. Bodessa sought unemployment compensation benefits,
and ultimately, the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) held that
Bodessa qualified for unemployment compensation. Hughes Drilling ap-
pealed to the county court seeking judicial review by a trial de novo. The
county court granted summary judgment to Hughes Drilling and reversed
the TEC's determination, holding that misconduct" 0 disqualified Bodessa
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. On appeal, the TEC
first argued that because Hughes Drilling implemented the drug testing pol-
icy after Bodessa's employment and continued to employ Bodessa with the
knowledge that Bodessa had not signed a written consent form, Hughes
Drilling waived its right to enforce the policy against Bodessa. The court
rejected this argument because, as an at-will employee, Bodessa's conduct in
452. Id.
453. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c).
454. Id.
455. Id. § 15.51(a).
456. Id. §§ 15.50-51.
457. Id.
458. Id. § 15.51(c).
459. 746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988), writ granted, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 643 (Sept.
14, 1988), writ withdrawn and writ denied, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 70 (Nov. 8, 1989).
460. For the definition of misconduct in the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act, see
supra note 311.
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continuing to work constituted an acceptance of the terms of the drug test-
ing policy.461 Second, the TEC argued that the policy was unreasonable in
that it violated Bodessa's fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and invasion of privacy. As the state interest called for
eliminating drug abusers from the private sector workplace and Bodessa im-
plicitly consented to the drug screening process by continuing to work after
receiving notice of the provisions of the policy, the court held that the em-
ployer did not violate Bodessa's fourth amendment rights.462 Third, the
TEC argued that the drug testing policy violated Bodessa's common-law
right to privacy. The court disagreed and held that Bodessa forfeited "his
'right to be left alone' while present in the work place" by impliedly con-
senting to the drug screening process." 3
After acknowledging that a violation of unreasonable rules cannot consti-
tute misconduct under the statute, the court reviewed the reasonableness of
the policy. 464 Upon finding that the objective of the policy was" 'to assist in
maintaining a safe working environment for employees,' "46s the court con-
cluded that the policy was both reasonable and reasonably calculated to en-
sure the safety of all employees. 466 The TEC appealed to the supreme court.
Initially, the supreme court granted writ of error on the issue of whether
Bodessa's continued employment constituted consent to Hughes Drilling's
drug testing policy. 467 The supreme court, however, ultimately concluded
that the application had been improvidently granted and denied the writ of
error.468
Recently, the supreme court denied a writ in a significant drug testing
case. In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Ina 469 Jennings, an at-will em-
ployee, sued her employer to prevent the company from implementing a
urinalysis drug testing program. The trial court found that Minco's drug
testing policy was lawful and enforceable. Jennings on appeal contended
that the employment-at-will doctrine was inapplicable and that an em-
ployee's right to privacy should not be required to yield to the at-will doc-
trine. The court of appeals rejected Jennings' arguments and affirmed the
trial court's judgment.470
The court, acknowledging that either party to an at-will employment con-
tract may modify the terms as a condition of continued employment, re-
461. 746 S.W.2d at 799-800 (citing Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 228
(Tex. 1986)).
462. Id. at 801.
463. Id. at 801-02.
464. Id.
465. Id. The court found that the drug testing was random and performed with concern
for each employee's privacy. Id.
466. Id.
467. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Co., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. . 643 (Sept. 14,
1988). The supreme court also granted writ of error on the issue of whether the court of
appeals correctly applied the substantial evidence standard of review in considering the TEC's
decision on the reasonableness of Hughes Drilling's drug testing policy. Id.
468. Id. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. . 70 (Nov. 8, 1989).
469. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
470. Id. at 498.
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jected Jennings' argument that she may continue her employment without
accepting the modification of her employment terms, namely the drug test-
ing program.47' The court found that under the at-will doctrine, Jennings
could either accept the new terms or quit, but that she could not compel
performance of her at-will contract according to its terms on the date of her
hire.472 The court also declined to accept Jennings' argument that her com-
mon law right of privacy enlarged her at-will contract rights and diminished
those of her employer because the importance of the right of privacy re-
quired that her at-will contract be modified to effectuate that policy. 473 The
court, noting the supreme court's narrow exception to the at-will doctrine in
Sabine Pilot Service, Inc, v. Hauck 474 and the importance of stare decisis,
rejected Jennings' contention that the court should create a second exception
to the at-will doctrine based upon the right of privacy.475
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the judicial and legislative developments covered in this
year's Texas Survey, the field of labor and emplpyment law is constantly
changing. More than perhaps any other area of the law, the changes in this
field bear the characteristics of a pendulum with employment rights moving
back and forth between employees and employers. The frequency and sever-
ity of the changes will be greater when they occur through the judicial pro-
cess, on a case-by-case basis. Conversely, the changes will be more studied
and controlled, and thus predictable, when they occur through the legislative
process. At least in the near term, changes in labor and employment law are
likely to occur through both the judiciary and the legislature. These changes
must be monitored carefully because they will almost certainly have a sub-
stantial impact upon employers doing business in Texas and those consider-
ing Texas as a business site.
471. Id. at 499 (citing Hathaway v. General Mills; Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986)).
The supreme court's denial of the writ in Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling
Fluids, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 70, on the issue whether Bodessa's continued employment consti-
tuted consent to Hughes Drilling's drug testing policy seems dispositive of this issue in Jen-
nings' application.
472. 765 S.W.2d at 502.
473. Id. at 500. The court also rejected Jennings' argument that the drug testing policy
violated her common-law right of privacy because the urinalysis would only be conducted with
her consent. Id. at 502.
474. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
475. 765 S.W.2d at 499-500.
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